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Problem
Personality, a construct representing the 
dynamic integration of the individual, remains compli­
cated, both in theory and in research. The purpose of 
this study was to explore a conceptual paradigm of per­
sonality through the relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and moral reasoning.
Researchers had not looked at the relationship 
between cognitive flexiblity, as measured by the Stroop 
Color and Word Test, and moral reasoning, as measured by 
the Defining Issues Test (DIT).
This study focused on the relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning. It looked for 
more than an understanding of the relationship, however.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
thus affording beginning research in the development of 
the proposed paradigm.
Method
The DIT and the Stroop Test were administered to 
freshman and sophomore college students. Chi-square and 
descriptive analyses of the data from 133 subjects were 
calculated.
Results
Four directional research hypotheses predicted a 
necessary-but-not-sufficient relationship between cogni­
tive flexibility and moral reasoning. Two hypotheses 
used the P score on the DIT while the other two involved 
the D measure. The findings supported two out of the 
four hypotheses; one on the P scores ( = 3.27) and one
on the D scores ( =  3.50) from the DIT.
While the other two research hypotheses were not
supported by the analyses, trends suggested by the data 
were studied by a number of t tests. These tests 
revealed significantly higher DIT means in the flexible 
group than the not flexible group in the third quartile D
grouping (t = 1.092 with 43 degrees of freedom and
E < .05) and in the upper quartile P grouping (t = 2.502 
with 23 degrees of freedom and g < .01).
It is believed that this study contributes direct 
and indirect support of a necessary-but-not-sufficient
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral 
reasoning. It may be said that cognitive flexibility is 
a prerequisite for higher moral development. It is not, 
however, the onlv component needed for such development.
The relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and moral reasoning can be taken as evidence for an 
interaction between the subsystems and cognitive mosaics 
within the context of the proposed paradigm.
In summary, this study provides beginning work on 
a personality paradigm and contributes both implications 
and applications of the findings.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Personality, a construct representing the dynamic 
integration of the individual, remains complicated, both 
in theory and in research. This study, while proposing a 
paradigm of one aspect of personality, primarily focuses 
on the empirical exploration within that paradigm of the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral 
reasoning. The paradigm also provides a theoretical 
perspective on how, in one respect, an individual inter­
acts with his environment.
This chapter includes background on the theoreti­
cal development, definitions of terms used in the disser­
tation, an explanation of the proposed paradigm, and 
statements delineating the focus of the investigation.
Background
Past trends in brain research have primarily 
focused on anatomical and hemispheric orientations.
Brain research currently, however, looks also to an 
overall pattern of cognition. There has been a move.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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therefore, from "part" or even "hemispheric" models to a 
focus on overall brain patterns.
The submitted paradigm evolved from a model 
developed by Wardell and Royce (1978), from this resear­
cher's unpublished master's thesis involving hemispheric 
processing, and from a careful observation of indi­
viduals' reasoning abilities and limitations evident 
within varying situations.
Models provide ways of organizing and synthesiz­
ing information and, in addition, provide frameworks of 
understanding for other paradigms. Fulfilling both of 
these functions, Wardell and Royce's (1978) personality 
model (see Chapter 2) contributes both a beginning 
framework of understanding and a point of departure for 
the proposed paradigm. The Wardell and Royce model was 
discovered in an attempt to connect cognition and affect 
within the personality. Due to its similarity in 
conceptualizations of the mind and personality with the 
proposed paradigm, further investigation and inclusion in 
the dissertation of the Wardell and Royce model resulted.
While not serving such functions, Ornstein's 
multimind theory (1986) does provide support for the 
proposed paradigm (see Chapter 2). Ornstein's views on 
multiple minds and on movement between them in interact­
ing within the environment is somewhat similar to the 
proposed paradigm. Both the Wardell and Royce and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Ornstein models offer representations of the mind and 
cognitive processes which have similar aspects to those 
of the proposed paradigm. Both models, in turn, lend 
theoretical support for this research. The two models 
and their relationship to the proposed paradigm will be 
explored in Chapter 2.
Personal research, itself, also prompted this 
study. The unpublished master's thesis shows significant 
differences in the types of processing used in the two 
hemispheres. Analyses and the implications of this 
information resulted in many new ideas. One idea, a 
realization of the many capabilities of the hemispheres, 
led to the conceptualization of "mosaics" (see page 5) 
and the dynamics of cognitive flexibility as defined in 
this study.
As mentioned, theory, research, and observations 
contributed to the development of this research. The 
observations of reasoning regression in several students 
in a graduate counseling program provided this third 
factor in the development of this research. A sig­
nificant proportion of entering students who appeared to 
be creative, bright, and independent were observed to 
regress during their first two quarters in the program.
The behavioral manifestations of this regression 
included increasing questions regarding what the teacher 
thought important, increasing concern for what would be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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on a test rather than more independent assimilation of 
covered topics, fewer verbalized applications of the 
material, fewer verbalized theorizations which differed 
from a framework under discussion, and other behaviors 
inappropriate for that level of graduate study. In 
general, these students appeared more dependent on the 
faculty, less creative, and less risk-taking; they had 
moved to a more sterile, "fill-in-the-blank" mentality.
This regression came during the highly stressful 
periods of entering and completing a graduate program.
As the stress continued, however, differing adaptations 
to this tension were noted. Some moved past the regres­
sion; others, unfortunately, failed to do so— or appeared 
unable to return to the levels of flexibility they had 
when they entered graduate school.
This observation, contributions from other 
theorists, and this researcher's own work during her 
master's program led to the definitions, proposed para­
digm, and chosen hypotheses which follow.
Definitions
So that the proposed paradigm and discussion of 
related studies and theories may be more fully under­
stood, the following terms are defined;
• Brain patterns— a construct representing a 
unique combination of cognitive components used within a 
situation. It is recognized that cognition does not work
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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alone in personality. Cognitive-affective represents a 
better term. Lack of adequate prior research with this 
term, however, limits the exploration of this study to 
just the cognitive aspect of personality.
• Cognition— all various modes of knowing (per­
ceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, etc.) in 
contrast to affective and conative dimensions of per­
sonality.
• Cognitive flexibility— involves the ability to 
utilize different cognitive mosaics or to create new ones 
as needed.
• Cognitive mosaic— a construct within the 
proposed paradigm referring to any particular brain 
pattern which is a combination of cognitive components.
• Cognitive style— broadly, the rather consis­
tent manner in which a person thinks or knows; more 
specifically, a particular group of cognitive patterns. 
This study defines cognitive style as a unique combina­
tion of an individual's particular cognitive mosaics and 
cognitive flexibility. While new mosaics and/or changes 
in usage occur through growth or regression, it is 
believed that the gestalt remains fairly stable.
• Hierarchies— refers to cognitive mosaic hier­
archies. The proposed paradigm consists of a cognitive 
mosaics repertoire with two hierarchical dimensions; (1) 
a dimension of individual adaptability (those mosaics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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containing a similar degree of adaptability) and (2) a 
dimension of mosaic recency (those mosaics developed last 
are highest in hierarchy).
• Hierarchical regression— conscious/unconscious 
selection of an inappropriate mosaic. This usage proves 
less helpful or efficient in processing information 
regarding a particular situation.
• Model— a system of organization which provides 
a framework for understanding relationships and proces­
ses. For the purpose of this paper it refers to the sys­
tem used by Wardell and Royce (1978).
# Moral reasoning— a construct referring to 
those special kinds of cognitive processing concerned 
with the "right" and "wrong" of behaviors. It is also 
defined here as the interaction between an individual's 
cognition and values.
# Necessary but not sufficient— this term is used 
frequently to describe a type of relationship within the 
proposed paradigm. In this usage the concept means that 
some ability (cognitive flexibility) is a necessary part 
of another ability (higher moral reasoning), but that the 
first ability (cognitive flexiblity) is not the onlv 
ability, characteristic, or factor necessary for the 
resulting ability (higher moral reasoning). This term, 
with the same meaning, appears in research and theory to 
describe relationships.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
• Paradigm— another term referring to a system 
of organization which provides a framework for under­
standing relationships and processes. For the purposes 
of this study, however, it refers to the system proposed 
by this researcher.
# Personality— the integrated, dynamic organiza­
tion of physical, mental, moral, and social dimensions 
(impulses, habits, interests, complexes, opinions, senti­
ments, beliefs, etc.).
Description of Proposed Paradigm
In this paradigm it is proposed that a basic 
function for organizing information about relationships 
and processes exists at birth and that the individual's 
interaction with the environment prompts further organi­
zational mosaics or patterns of processing.
A pattern consists of a unique combination of 
cognitive processes within the mind. As an acknowledge­
ment that any pattern or mosaic does not occur within a 
vacuum, the pattern is described as a brain pattern. 
Cognition does not act alone within the personality. 
Cognition-affeet represents a better term. Due to lack 
of adequate prior research under this term and the limits 
of this investigation, the study is focused on just the 
cognitive aspect of the personality. No distinction is 
therefore made between mind and brain. Whether such 
patterns are identifiable by physiological testing, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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whether subdivisions of mosaics are possible, remains 
unspeculated.
The first pattern may be genetically tied and 
thus develops earlier than other patterns. It may even 
be that hand dominance, which occurs during the first few 
years of life, is a product of such a configuration. It 
is also this basic pattern which may allow the first 
interaction with the environment.
Once this first mosaic of processing is firmly 
established, the individual is able to interpret and 
utilize data from the environment. This pattern, 
therefore, exists as just one of many eventual patterns. 
Varied experiences (any experience from going to a 
circus, the first day in school or a church, positive 
interactions with peers, to child abuse), maturation, and 
learning prompt development of new ways of perceiving 
data.
The proposed paradigm includes a repertoire of 
mosaics involving the cognitive subsystem. It is 
believed that this repertoire has two dimensions: (1) a
hierarchy of individual adaptability (those mosaics which 
contain a similar degree of adaptability— (see Figure 1) 
and (2) a hierarchy of mosaic recency (those mosaics 
developed last are highest in the hierarchy).
Figure 1 includes a dimensional continuum of 
adaptability. The factors listed in the middle (ranging
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1. A two-dimensional representation of the 
recency and adaptation continuums. The factors listed at 
the intersection of these two dimensions represent forces 
that may either prompt or hinder movement to the more 
adaptive mosaics. This, in turn, affects the nurturance 
or stifling of cognitive flexibility.
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from affect to values) are varied experiences and 
learnings which prompt usage and/or creation of new 
mosaics.
This research defines more adaptive as an optimal 
interaction with the environment to produce beneficial 
results over time. While the components may nurture the 
move to more adaptive mosaics, some may act as a hin­
drance to movement in this direction. As mosaics are 
engaged, they become stronger. Some individuals use the 
less adaptive mosaics— some by choice, others uncon­
sciously.
It is believed that training can lower the power 
or pull of less adaptive mosaics and those past experien­
ces that reinforce an already existing barrier in the 
process of growth.
A potential starting point to choose to use more 
adaptive mosaics exists when the individual becomes aware 
of his own thinking and strives to use those characteris­
tics associated with higher flexibility. Following this, 
usage of more adaptive mosaics would prompt an opposite 
force moving the person to the more adaptive end of the 
continuum.
The two dimensions and the placement of the 
mosaics is represented by Figure 2. The dots represent 
mosaics; the size of the dot represents the strength or 
pulling power of a particular mosaic. The dots also
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
>1
0 o ° 8O 0 « u o 2° 0 ^® O °
o 01 O O 01 ®
o
IncreasingO O O Adaptationo o (5)0 o O O OO O 0 ° 0 O
Figure 2. A visual interaction between the two dimen­
sions of adaptation and recency and the cognitive mosa­
ics. It is believed that the left side of the continuum 
represents a usage of mosaics which is less available to 
conscious awareness. In contrast, it is believed that 
increasing adaptation includes more usage of mosaics with 
conscious awareness. At this end of the continuum, 
therefore, usage of mosaics includes both conscious and 
unconscious processes. The dots represent mosaics; the 
size of the dots reflect the strength of a particular 
mosaic. Mosaics A or D, for instance has more strength 
than mosaic B or C.
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represent mosaics both within a certain level of recency 
and level of adaptability.
Figure 3 incorporates the above dimensions and 
mosaics with levels of adaptation in this conceptualiza­
tion. The left side of the figure shows the less 
adaptive mosaics with highly permeable developmental 
levels. This represents the belief that of the less 
adaptive mosaics there is less differentiation between 
mosaics developed at differing stages of life. In other 
words, an individual is more likely to use a more 
immature mosaic within the less adaptive range than when 
more adaptive mosaics are employed.
As with Figure 2, the size of the dots represent 
the strength of the mosaic and the factors listed 
previously in Figure 1 act as prompters or inhibitors to 
growth towards the right side of the figure.
As mentioned above, mosaics can exert differing 
attractions or pulling powers. In this proposed paradigm 
mosaics derive strength from usage. As an individual 
uses a mosaic, this increases the strength of the 
pattern. Therefore, when less adaptive mosaics are 
frequently used, this causes a pulling power away from 
growth of the individual. On the other hand, with 
awareness and choice, an individual can consciously 
strengthen the more adaptive mosaics. This has the 
effect of expanding and strengthening the entire




O O  Adaptation
Figure 3. A combination of Figures 1 and 2 in addition 
to a visual representation of the levels of adaptation.
It is noted that the left side of the figure, the less 
adaptive end of the continuum, shows less differentia­
tion/more permeable levels. The more adaptive side, on 
the other hand, shows greater differentiation of the 
levels of recency. This also reflects a more conscious 
usage of mosaics— a definition of cognitive flexibility. 
For example, there is a more equal chance of using mosaic 
B or C than A or D.
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repertoire— another definition of growth and increased 
flexibility.
Cognitive flexibility is the ability to utilize 
an appropriate pattern or to create other patterns as 
needed. It forms the core of the paradigm and describes 
the individual interacting with the environment. The 
types and usage of patterns exist within the cognitive 
aspect of the personality, yet influence other aspects of 
personality and behavior.
Statement of the Problem
The relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and cognitive styles, behaviors, and personality is not 
fully understood. It would appear, therefore, that the 
relating of cognitive flexibility with moral reasoning 
was warranted as an area of study.
Moral reasoning is an established area of current 
theory and research. A substantial proportion of this 
research uses the Defining Issues Test (DIT) in exploring 
the relationship between moral reasoning and cognition- 
affect, personality styles, and other constructs. 
Researchers had not, however, looked at its relationship 
with cognitive flexibility, as measured by the Stroop 
Color and Word Test. More specifically, there was no 
research which compared the Defining Issues Test and the 
Stroop Color and Word Test within any population.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Warden and Royce (1978) , providing a founda­
tional model, stated the continued need for empirical 
studies in the area of personality. As theorists, they 
stated that empirical research may be some time in 
coming, but that such research remains necessary to the 
area of personality (Wardell & Roycs, 1978).
It was not proposed that this study provides 
empirical support for the Wardell and Royce model. It 
was instead a beginning of empirical exploration of the 
proposed paradigm.
Delineation of Research Problem
Cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning are 
seen to exist as aspects within a holistic and dynamic 
concept of personality. Since there are differing 
abstractions of personality, this section will delineate 
briefly the structure of these elements as defined by 
this researcher.
The theoretical orientation for this study is a 
dynamic framework, as envisioned by this researcher and 
others (see Chapter 2). This study focused essentially 
on the cognition aspect of the personality and on flexi­
bility within cognitive mosaics or patterns. Cognitive 
flexibility involves certain capacities within this area 
of the personality structure.
The cognitive area of the personality, in turn, 
underlies an individual's styles and values (Wardell &
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Royce, 1978). This researcher believes that moral rea­
soning develops and exists within a fusion of a person's 
cognitive flexibility and values. From these integrated 
aspects, the personality is formed. Cognitive flexi­
bility and moral reasoning, as measured by the Stroop 
Test and Defining Issues Test (DIT) instruments, con­
stituted the personality dynamic under investigation.
Purpose of the Studv 
This study focused on the relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning. It looked for 
more than an understanding of the relationship, however, 
thus affording heuristic value.
Statement of Research Hypotheses 
The Stroop Test and DIT testing manuals provide 
standardized administration instructions and practical 
norms for usage in research. The Stroop Color and Word 
Test consists of three tasks using the names of colors 
and colored print to create a novel assignment which 
involves something that the subject has never done prior 
to taking this test (see Chapter 3 for further descrip­
tion) . Performance on these different tasks and com- 
parisions between these performances produce a cognitive 
flexibility score.
The median of the sample's scores was used for 
dividing the population in terms of flexibility— those
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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above this measure are classified as flexible; those 
below this measure are classified as constricted or not 
flexible.
The Defining Issues Test consists of six 
vignettes involving moral reasoning dilemmas and state­
ments reflecting levels of moral reasoning stages devel­
oped by Lawrence Kohlberg (see Chapter 2). An 
individual's response to these statements provide what 
are called P and D scores. The P score represents a 
weighted formula using responses from the top two levels 
of reasoning; the D score uses a weighted formula 
reflecting responses from all levels. Thus both scores 
reflect levels of moral reasoning.
The P score reflects the "'relative importance a 
subject gives to principled moral considerations in 
making a decision about moral dilemmas'" (Rest, 1979).
In contrast, the D score reflects an "overall index of 
moral judgment development . . . the score is higher to 
the extent that the subject gives high ratings to high
stage items, and the score is lower to the extent that
the subject gives high ratings to low stage items" (Rest, 
1986).
The P and D scores are divided into four group­
ings. Both P and D scores represent a general index of
moral reasoning maturity. The following hypotheses 
reflect these suggested divisions and classifications.
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1. Among those subjects with a P score of 35-46 
on the DIT, there will be a significantly higher 
frequency of Stroop flexibility scores above the 
median of the sample than below the median.
2. Among those subjects with e. D score of 21-27 
on the DIT, there will be a significantly 
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores 
above the median of the sample than below the 
median.
3. Among those subjects with a P score of 47 or 
higher on the DIT, there will be a significantly 
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores 
above the median of the sample than below the 
median.
4. Among those subjects with a D score of 28 or 
higher on the DIT, there will be a significantly 
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores 
above the median of the sample than below the 
median.
Importance of the Studv 
The exploration of the proposed paradigm provides 
insights into this theory and the application of this 
theory. It also offers opportunities for further under­
standing of human processing and ideas for additional 
research in this and related areas of personality theory.
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Delimitations 
The study was delimited in terms of focus and 
population. It proposed to support a paradigm with the 
chosen hypotheses. The hypotheses were merely one focus, 
one empirical examination drawn from a conceptual para­
digm. These hypotheses, however, provided valuable 
information on the relationship between moral reasoning 
and cognitive flexibility and information regarding the 
tentative paradigm. The population was delimited to 
beginning freshmen and sophomores in church-related 
colleges.
Limitations
Limitations included the inability to generalize 
to all populations. This was countered, however, in an 
interest in the tests themselves rather than in the 
population per se.




This study focused on the relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning. Cognitive 
flexibility was operationally defined in terms of the 
Stroop Color and Word Test, and moral reasoning by the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT).
The highly conceptual and relatively extensive 
nature of the concepts emphasizes a need for a carefully 
chosen delimitation of the literature under discussion. 
This chapter first addresses the justification of the 
proposed paradigm and research question. Because of the 
prior description of this tentative paradigm and its 
relationship with the hypotheses, this chapter includes 
contrasts with some of the presented theories. With this 
background in mind, this chapter then explores the lit­
erature review of cognitive flexibility and moral reason­
ing and research involving the Stroop Test and the DIT.
Theoretical Foundation for Hypotheses 
While the paradigm relating to this research is 
original with this study, other theories offered creative
20
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ideas which further will be seen to justify the hypo­
theses' development. Wardell and Royce (1978), for 
example, provide a background model and central support 
to the paradigm. These theorists and Ornstein (1986) 
provide theories of mind and personality which both 
contrast and support this proposed paradigm and tested 
hypotheses.
Wardell and Rovce
The Wardell and Royce model (1978) supplies a 
theoretical backdrop and points of reference for a system 
of unresearched ideas— the proposed paradigm.
The lowest systems of their model (sensory and 
motor— see Figure 4) consists of an individual's interac­
tion with the environment. The cognitive and affective 
subsystems are at the next level underlying the person's 
style and value subsystems. Providing a comprehensive 
structure, a gestalt— the personality subsumes these 
various subsystems.
The subsystems interact with each other within 
the personality. For instance, an individual's lifestyle 
evolves from an interaction between affective and value 
subsystems ; an individual's world view derives from the 
interaction of the cognitive and style subsystems; an 
interaction between the style and value subsystems cre­
ates a person's self-image. Therefore, there is inter­
dependence between subsystems within the mind.
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Figure 4. A visual representation of the proposed para­
digm with the Wardell and Royce model. The insert de­
picts the cognitive subsystem; the layers of rectangles 
represent a potentially infinite number of cognitive 
mosaics. The abilities or aspects of any mosaic are not 
unique to that mosaic, but each mosaic does consist of a 
unique combination of abilities. (Adapted figure taken 
from Wardell & Royce, Journal of Personality. 1978, 474- 
505) .
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As mentioned earlier, the Wardell and Royce model 
provides a framework. The proposed paradigm focuses on 
the cognitive subsystem and its interactions with other 
subsystems (see Figure 4). Here cognitive mosaics would 
exist within the cognitive subsystem. This study's 
definition of moral reasoning equates it with the inter­
action between the values and cognitive subsystems.
With this relationship in mind, it is believed 
that further exploration of the conceptual similari­
ties/dissimilarities between the model and the proposed 
paradigm will allow for a more complete understanding of 
this research.
Wardell and Royce's definition of cognitive style 
is one point of connectedness between these two models. 
The 1978 article focuses on the style subsystem and its 
interactions with cognition and affect. They describe 
cognitive styles, affective styles, and cognitive-affec­
tive styles. They define style as ". . . a characteris­
tic mode or way of manifesting cognitive and/or affective 
phenomena" (Royce, 1973). These styles, as mentioned, 
affect and are affected by other subsystems within their 
personality model.
Wardell and Royce describe cognitive style in 
terms of a manifestation of cognition. Their cognitive 
styles include the (1) rational, (2) empirical, and (3) 
metaphoric.
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This research, in contrast, defines cognitive 
style as the unique combination of an individual's cogni­
tive mosaics and his flexibility.
In review, cognitive mosaics consist of a com­
bination of cognitive components. Cognitive flexibility 
involves the ability to select or even create these 
mosaics which are appropriate to situational needs. A 
comparison of the Wardell and Royce model with this 
study's cognitive styles and eight substyles, therefore, 
involves relating the substyles to cognitive flexibility 
and cognitive mosaics.
For instance, certain cognitive substyles are 
associated with cognitive flexiblity. This means that 
the description of a particular cognitive substyle also 
describes cognitive flexiblity.
Other cognitive substyles relate to the cognitive 
mosaics. These substyles describe characteristics of any 
particular mosaic, or pattern. These substyles are seen, 
therefore, to reflect a combination of cognitive com­
ponents. The direction (Wardell and Royce describe 
certain substyles in terms of polar opposites— e.g., 
abstract versus concrete) and/or intensity of these 
substyles seen in any pattern differs with the mosaic in 
question.
It is not proposed that these substyles exist 
within the cognitive system. It is proposed, however.
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that this study's cognitive style combination of cogni­
tive mosaics and cognitive flexibility underlies Wardell 
and Royce's eight cognitive substyles and the three 
cognitive styles.
Wardell and Royce's eight substyles or charac­
teristics tie in with this study's conceptualization of 
cognitive style, cognitive mosaics, and cognitive flexi­
bility as follows;
Cognitive complexity—
(Wardell and Royce definition): An
individual with complexity " . . .  makes greater 
use of his cognitive structure . . .  he is . .
. flexible, and more independent of the judg­
ment of others."
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This characteristic comes closest to the defi­
nition of cognitive flexibility. It parallels 
flexibility in the cognitive subsystem and 
reflects, therefore, the part of cognitive 
style associated with cognitive flexibility.
Differentiation—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
represents an inclination to ". . . pursue and 
use more detailed conceptualizations . . . "
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(Association with proposed paradigm): 
This reflects the part of cognitive style 
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo­
nents .
Category width—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
involves " . . .  broad versus narrow categoriz­
ing . . . ”
(Association with proposed paradigm): 
This reflects the part of cognitive style 
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo­
nents .
Conceptual integration—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
reflects an ". . . inclination to explore and 
develop relationships among concepts." This 
concept may be considered a part of cognitive 
complexity.
(Association with proposed paradigm): 
This reflects the part of cognitive style 
associated with cognitive flexibility.
Analytical versus relational—
(Wardell and Royce definition); This 
involves a preference for a type of concept—  
inferential versus relational.
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(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects the part of cognitive style 
associated with the cognitive mosaic com­
ponents .
Compartmentalization—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
reflects a ” '. . . tendency to compartmental­
ize ideas . . .  in discrete categories . . .'" 
(Messick & Kogan, 1963).
(Association with proposed paradigm);
This reflects that part of style associated 
with cognitive mosaic components.
Abstract versus concrete—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
involves the use of ". . . more information and 
more strategies to solve problems."
(Association with proposed paradigm):
It is believed that those with relatively more 
abstract style show greater cognitive flexi­
bility in the cognitive subsystem. The basis 
for this belief lies in the established 
association between higher reasoning and the 
ability to work with abstract concepts. The 
abstract style reflects that aspect of cogni­
tive style associated with flexibility.
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Leveling versus sharpening—
(Wardell and Royce definition): Leveling
involves lessening "fine shades of distinc­
tion"; sharpening involves increasing distinc­
tions between items.
(Association with proposed paradigm);
This reflects the aspect of style associated 
with the cognitive mosaics combination.
Unlike the proposed paradigm, Wardell and Royce 
place flexibility within the affective subsystem. Here 
flexibility is one reaction to intrusive stimuli. Within 
their theory, apparent comfort with contradictory stimuli 
or interference describes flexibility. This study, in 
contrast, does not define flexibility in terms of affect 
or motivation (or at least affect alone).
Wardell and Royce propose that motivational 
(tolerance for the unconventional and constricted versus 
flexible) and emotional (reflection versus impulsivity 
and physiognomic versus literal) substyles contribute to 
rational, empirical, and metaphoric higher-order affec­
tive styles.
It has been acknowledged that cognitive mosaics 
and cognitive flexibility are involved in other subsys­
tems. In fact, other researchers' descriptions of "flex­
ible" individuals (see page 41) include apparent ease 
with emotional expression. It is not unexpected.
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therefore, that Wardell and Royce's affective substyles 
also reflect characteristics of cognitive flexiblity or 
parallel descriptions of cognitive mosaics.
The affective substyles in which these charac­
teristics are noted are as follows;
Tolerance for the unconventional—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
reflects an "'. . . acceptance of experiences 
which do not agree with what one knows to be 
true" (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & 
Spence, 1959).
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects that aspect of cognitive style 
associated with cognitive flexibility.
Constricted versus flexible—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This is
associated with automization and ability to 
cope with interference.
(Association with proposed paradigm): As
noted on the previous page, the use of the 
affective style subsystem and some of the 
traits of this style differ in certain aspects 
from the proposed study. For instance, Wardell 
and Royce define "constricted" individuals as 
those showing more aspiration to overcome
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contradictory stimuli. This study would assign 
this characteristic to "flexible” individuals.
Reflection versus impulsivity—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
involves the amount of alternative hypotheses 
involved in problem analysis.
(Association with proposed paradigm); 
Reflection involves that part of cognitive 
style associated with cognitive flexibility.
Physiognomic versus literal—
(Wardell and Royce definition): This
represents the preference for the dynamic and 
emotional versus literal aspects of objects and 
ideas.
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects that part of cognitive style 
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo­
nents .
The constricted versus flexible control substyle 
makes up the rational affective style. Tolerance for the 
unconventional and reflection versus impulsivity sub- 
styles make up the empirical affective style. And meta­
phoric, the third higher-order affective style, consists 
of the physiognomic versus literal substyle.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
These substyles or characteristics relate to 
cognitive abilities and/or affective traits. They also 
underlie the rational, empirical, and metaphoric styles 
at the cognitive-affective style level. This study does 
not concern itself with labeling or delineating these 
system's styles, but the above does compare/contrast with 
the proposed theory.
The proposed paradigm draws on the subsystems 
viewpoint and the dynamic nature of the personality. It 
also parallels the Wardell and Royce model on the sub­
style characteristics— certain characteristics that make 
up a cognitive style relate to flexibility or the mosa­
ics. The same applies to the affective domain.
On other points, the two models do not contrast 
nor necessarily agree with each other. Here the dif­
ference is one of focus.
On yet other points, the model and paradigm 
differ in their explanation or viewpoints. For instance, 
this study's definition of flexibility (as operationally 
defined by Golden in his Stroop Color and Word Test 
manual, 1978) is original with this study. Whereas, 
Wardell and Royce define flexibility in terms of an 
affective style, this study views flexibility in terms of 
cognitive mosaics— a dynamic combination creating cogni­
tive style.
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Another difference involves the dynamics within 
the subsystems. Wardell and Royce propose that values 
are more closely tied with the affective subsystem, 
whereas styles are more closely connected with the cogni­
tive subsystem. In contrast, it is proposed that all 
arrows (connectors between the subsystems— see Figure 
4, page 22) represent equal energy or influence.
These differences, both of a global and more 
detail-oriented nature, combine with both supportive and 
neutral aspects to better reflect the proposed paradigm.
In summary, the model and the paradigm do not 
agree on all points of interest (often simply due to 
differences in foci). The Wardell and Royce theory, 
however, does provide both a framework within which the 
proposed paradigm takes form and support for the theory 
and chosen hypotheses.
While credit goes to Wardell and Royce for their 
contributions to the study, the reader should note that 
cognitive mosaics, this study's definition of cognitive 
flexibility, and related theory are original with this 
research paradigm.
In summary, it is believed that the differences 
between the model and the paradigm do not detract from 
support of the study. Instead, it more clearly outlines 
and defines the theory and background for the research 
and the potential for empirical investigation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Robert Ornstein*s "Multiminds”
Ornstein goes beyond the popular "two brain"— two 
mind theme to a multimind view. He claims that there are 
many minds which are specialized and come into play as 
necessary by situational demands. Ornstein explains 
incognizance of this situation in terms of limited con­
sciousness— only one mind operates, even though briefly, 
at a time within one's awareness. Here the mind con­
sists of a number of minds, each a mixed structure of 
functions which operate to simplify information.
Ornstein delineates a hierarchical structure with 
an independent ability of governing which organizes, 
infers, interprets, and controls the mind processes. It 
fails to be omnipotent, however, in that lower minds may 
operate instead of minds higher in the hierarchy which 
are more adaptive to experiential demands. The lower 
levels within the structure are rigid in contrast to 
higher functions which are more "intelligent" and flexi­
ble.
As minds develop, capacity to meet environmental 
demands increases within the "governing" capacities and 
within a margin of error— a margin of error occurs when 
the wrong mind, as it were, steps in to process.
While he sees these minds as evolutionary, 
Ornstein states that experience can strengthen mental 
operating control and increase an individual's ability to 
choose higher order minds instead of reactive, smaller
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minds. This aspect, in addition to a concept of multiple 
minds, supports similar aspects (mosaics) in the proposed 
paradigm.
The proposed paradigm stands in partial contrast 
to this theory since cognitive flexibility focuses on 
movement within process-oriented mosaics rather than 
Ornstein's intra-mind flexibility. While Ornstein pre­
supposes flexibility between these minds, he views this 
as an absolute and sometimes inappropriate, intrapsychic 
movement.
He differs from the proposed paradigm in that he 
appears to outline a more inclusive personality aspect in 
his "minds" concept and that the minds appear within a 
consciousness/unconsciousness framework rather than a 
personality infrastructure.
These differences, however, did not detract from 
the foundation upholding the hypotheses and the paradigm 
proposed here.
Proposed conceptual paradigm 
of personality
The proposed paradigm consists of a hierarchy of 
many mosaics involving cognitive components. The ability 
to move within these mosaics enhances biological and 
psychological adaptation and survival. These mosaics can 
be used in describing the relationship, development, and 
regression involving flexibility and moral reasoning.
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The relationship described. While described 
earlier (see Chapter 1), this section reiterates the 
suggested relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
moral reasoning for the ease of understanding.
The research focused essentially on the cognitive 
subsystem of the personality and on flexibility within 
cognitive mosaics or patterns.
This researcher defines cognitive flexibility as 
the ability to move from one pattern to another and to 
create other patterns as needed. It forms the core of 
the paradigm and describes the individual interacting 
with the environment.
The types and usage of patterns exist within the 
cognitive subsystem of the personality, yet influence 
other aspects of personality and behavior.
The cognitive subsystem of the personality, in 
turn, influences aspects of style and the value subsys­
tems. Moral reasoning develops and exists within a 
fusion of cognitive flexibility in the cognitive subsys­
tem and the value subsystem.
Moral reasoning pertains to those kinds of opera­
tions involving cognitive components to make decisions 
regarding the the "right" and "wrong" of behaviors. As 
such, it involves the value subsystem in the Wardell and 
Royce model (see Figure 4 page 22). Some individuals 
(e.g.. Conn, 1987) claim that higher moral reasoning, in 
its usage of empathy, involves a cognitive-affective
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operation (e.g., Thomson, 1989). This researcher agrees 
with this, and believes that the personality subsystems 
function within an interacting system. This is not, 
however, a matter of concern to this dissertation. From 
these and other integrated systems, the personality 
develops.
Human development. Both cognition and moral 
reasoning show qualitatively different phases in develop­
ment over time and experience. Piaget, Kohlberg, and 
many others (Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Goldstein, 
et al., 1978) support this aspect of development. While 
Piaget did not believe in regression of his broad stages, 
Kohlberg and researchers in other cognitive areas report 
regression in reasoning/cognition.
Regression in the two concepts. A further paral­
lel of the relation between flexibility and moral reason­
ing within the paradigm exists in the noted regression 
(pages 3-4) and the following studies under stressful 
situations.
Serino (1977) researched the interaction between 
DIT scores and cognitive frustration. While he found 
insignificant effects, £ (2,6) = 3.56, p > .05, he argues 
that regression remains possible within moral reasoning.
In contrast, Kohlberg and Kramer (cited in Rest, 
1986) report regression in moral reasoning under the 
stress of a college experience. However, this and other
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studies do not provide the support for this research as 
is found in studies on cognition.
In one study on cognition, Larcom (cited in 
Serino, 1977) found significant interaction between 
frustration and regression of cognitive abilities on a 
given task. Broverman and Lazarus (1958) found that 
task-induced stress reduced cognitive functions, with 
weaker cognitive "subsystems" temporarily unused. (In 
terms of this paradigm, such weaker systems may include 
those less practiced, younger, higher-order, and more 
flexible mosaics). Here these researchers describe 
"cognitive subsystems" as inherent tendencies of function 
which maintain organization while processing interfering 
stimuli— this necessitates flexibility or results in 
regression.
Using a modified Stroop Test, Commali, Wapner, 
and Werner (1962) reported a significant relationship 
E < .01 between age and interference/flexibility scores. 
They report increasing flexibility with age, a leveling 
off during adulthood, and a decrease in flexibility with 
older ages. They interpret the results of old age as 
lessened differentiation and hierarchical control— in 
other words, regression. While results with the elderly 
(e.g., Rush, Panek, & Russell, 1987) may actually reflect 
increased stress in many areas of living, it is best not 
to speculate on this aspect within the paradigm or 
changes or lack of change in morality after the age of
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65. This study defines moral maturity in terms of adult­
hood (peak) flexibility.
The proposed paradigm interprets these studies in 
terms of intra-individual flexibility and stress. With 
stress, those individuals who show less cognitive flexi­
bility may regress to a basic mosaic, but a mosaic that 
proves inappropriate given the individual's biological 
and psychological maturity.
Perhaps the inappropriate aspects of such pro­
cessing result, in part, from the lesser usage of affec­
tive data, number of stimuli, and variety of external/ 
internal cues seen in less flexible subjects. This study 
proposes that it is the unique qualities of flexibility 
that provide the necessary processing capabilities for 
higher order moral reasoning; higher order moral reason­
ing requires the ability to analyze a wide variety of 
data from diverse angles.
This conceptualization justifies the necessity of 
flexibility in higher moral reasoning without it neces­
sarily being the only factor involved in such develop­
ment. This idea, in addition to parallels in development 
and regression, describes the proposed paradigm in terms 
of the research hypotheses. This paradigm, the theory 
posited by Wardell and Royce, and Ornstein's recent 
"multiminds" substantiate theoretical support of the 
study. In moving from theoretical support to research
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the following sections explore relevant studies in the 
area of cognitive flexiblity and moral reasoning.
Cognitive Flexibility
Exploration of cognitive flexibility must include 
a definition of the term and discussion of related 
research classified under cognitive controls, cognitive 
styles, and metacognition terminology. Each area, in 
turn, adds to the understanding of this complex con­
struct .
Defined
While cognitive flexibility exists as a construct 
within research and theory, its name and theoretical 
structure sometimes differs with individual researchers. 
Here the term cognitive flexibility is defined as the 
capacity to move from one pattern to another and to 
create new patterns as needed.
This study restricted flexibility to cognition 
and to the construct measured by the Stroop Color and 
Word Test. Golden (1978) says that the Stroop Test mea­
sures the basic ability to "select relevant information 
from one's environment in a flexible manner...such an 
individual is better able...to adapt to new circumstance 
to more effectively function in general." The inter­
ference score, used in this study, ". . .is thought to
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measure a pure dimension of cognitive flexbility"
(Golden, 1978).
On defining cognitive flexibility in terms of 
personality, reference is made to Wardell and Royce 
(1978) who describe a dynamic, integrated personality 
consisting of subsystems and consider flexibility 
within the stvle subsystem. This study restricted flexi­
bility to the cognitive system. It does use, however, 
the same theory of personality and definitions of subsys­
tems. The following represents a summation of important, 
related work.
Cognitive controls
Cognitive controls, proposed by Klein (Gardner, 
Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; Klein, 1970), are 
stable modes of interacting with the environment.
Ludwig (1981) further defines such controls as conflict 
free, non-defensive aspects of the ego structure.
Proposed controls consist of flexibility-constriction, 
leveling-sharpening, and equivalence range. Hartman 
(cited in Ludwig, 1981) defines controls as independent, 
innate capacities which develop according to the 
increasing demands as an individual grows older.
Controls, therefore, are adaptive functions, and 
all of these equate with a person's cognitive style 
(Hartman, 1951; Klein, 1970).
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Researchers (e.g., Gardner et al., 1959; Klein, 
1970; Moran, 1984) use the Stroop Test to contrast sub­
jects chiefly using the flexible pole of the cognitive 
control versus subjects employing the constricted aspect. 
These studies report that those classified as constricted 
by Stroop measurements appeared to dislike ambiguity, 
utilized few feelings in consciousness, had more apparent 
difficulty in communicating with others, and categorized 
reality through cognition rather than through both cogni­
tive and affective means.
Apparent ease of expression of affect, indif­
ference to ambiguity, and other contrasts described those 
labeled flexible by their performance on the Stroop Test. 
The flexibility-constricted control exists as one among 
several functions. As mentioned earlier, this grouping 
of employed patterns leads to the next distinction— that 
of cognitive style.
Cognitive stvle
The construct cognitive style pertains to "the 
course of adaptation to particular situations" (Smith & 
Klein, 1953, p. 183). In other words, the type and 
unique usage of particular collective patterns make up 
the cognitive styles.
While cognitive styles develop slowly through 
experience (Messich, 1976), some researchers refer to 
these styles as relatively stable over both time and
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situations (Gardner, 1953; Messich, 1976; Smith & Klein, 
1953). Showing the overlap between cognitive and other 
subsystem flexibility, Messich (1976) includes flexi­
bility as one dimension of the cognitive style.
The definitions of researchers (Broverman & 
Lazarus, 1958; Broverman, 1960a; Broverman, 1960b; 
Broverman & Lazarus, 1964; Dockett, 1968; Gardner, 1953; 
Goldstein & Blademan, 1978) describe a consistent, 
inclusive aspect of the personality which maintains an 
active relationship with the environment.
Definition of cognitive flexibility now moves to 
educational application under the term, metacognition.
Metacoanition
In that it is believed that an individual's 
unique experiences and genetics form cognitive style, it 
cannot be taught. However, formal environmental training 
fosters it through the use of cognitive strategies. Such 
strategies are found in the area of metacognition in 
educational research. Flavell (cited in Wang & Richarde,
1985) describes metacognitive knowledge as a learner's 
self-awareness as to what can or cannot be done cogni­
tively. Moreover, the following research supports the 
likelihood that self-awareness can be learned.
Control, in addition to awareness, brings this 
term closer to cognitive flexibility. Educators and 
other theorists imbue metacognition with the ability to
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direct processing of information and behavior to one or 
the other hemispheres according to task requirements 
(Hall & Esposito, 1984; Holowinsky, 1984; Way, 1985).
The proposed paradigm differs in not segmenting 
the systems under control. In the depiction of mosaics 
involving the brain as a whole, it differs from the hemi­
spheric emphasis still employed by some theorists. It 
would further emphasize the accessing quality of the 
control— Moore (1982) comes closest with his inclusion of 
reflective and multiple access in his definition of 
metacognition.
While debate over the metacognition construct 
exists (Holowinsky, 1984), research continues (e.g., 
Moore, 1982; Slife, 1985; Wang & Richarde, 1985; Way, 
1985) . As noted, this present construct does not agree 
with certain conceptualizations of metacognition. Fur­
thermore, unlike the more application-oriented studies, 
this study is an exploration of the paradigm's dynamic 
structure.
Other related research
Mention may be made of other studies which are 
indirectly related to this research. These studies 
include exploration of experts versus novices (Glaser,
1985), automization (Broverman & Lazarus, 1964; Hartman, 
1951), and training in response widening (Kane & Arnold,
1986).
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The StrooD Color and Word Test
The Stroop Color and Word Test, based on Ligon's 
(Ligon, 1932; Stroop, 1935) color-naming theory, has been 
used in personality, cognitive, and psychodiagnostic 
research and with populations of adults, children, devel- 
opmentally disabled, and those diagnosed with mental 
disorders.
The test consists of three timed sections. The 
first involves reading the names of colors printed in 
black ink on white in a 5 by 20 matrix. The second 
consists of reading the colors in a 5 by 2 0 matrix. The 
last part consists of reading the color of the ink in 
which the words are printed, not the word shown. For 
instance, the person would say "blue" when the word "red" 
was printed in blue ink. This also exists in a 5 by 20 
matrix. A formula involving these sections produces a 
flexibility score.
While exact administration and scoring procedures 
have differed among researchers in the past, a standard­
ized manual now exists. The instrument is prepared for 
either individual or group administration. Chapter 3 
includes procedures used in this research.
Important studies using the Stroop Test have been 
mentioned, and hundreds of others exist. Researchers 
report mixed results of the Stroop Test relative to 
various aspects of personality (Callaway, 1959; Hochman, 
1971; Jensen, 1965; Lowe, 1985, Ludwig, 1981; Podell &
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Phillips, 1959; Rush, Panek, & Russell, 1987; Stein & 
Langer, 1966; Thurstone & Mellinger, 1953; Williams & 
Nulty, 1986; etc.).
Broverman and Lazarus (1964), however, report 
pertinent information in reference to personality regard­
ing the relationship between results on the Stroop Test 
and two projective tests, the Thematic Apperception Test 
and the Rorschach Test. They found significant correla^ 
tions between scores on the Stroop Test and the number of 
highly integrated responses and indications of ego 
strength in the two projectives.
Another important study focusing on personality 
(Stein & Langer, 1966) compared personality characteris­
tics with flexibility scores on a variant of the Stroop 
Test (Color Phonetic Symbol Test— covert incongruity as 
compared to the Stroop Test's overt incongruity). These 
researchers report low cognitive interference from the 
incongruity of the Stroop Test and significantly higher 
intra- and interpersonal effectiveness.
If the level of anxiety and the coping mechanisms 
affects, in part, an individual's efficacy, then the 
following study finds similar results. Dawkins and 
Furnham (1989) explored those using a repressive coping 
process and low and high anxious individuals. Those 
classified as high anxiety on the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory showed a decrement in performance compared to 
the low anxious group, but did better than those
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classified as using repressive coping styles by the 
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale.
Wapner and Warner (cited in Stein & Langer, 1966) 
compared scores on this same instrument with the Adjust­
ment Check list and report significantly less psychologi­
cal disturbance and less deviation in personality with 
higher flexibility scores. Thus, the value of the Stroop 
Test in personality research depends on the aspect of 
personality under investigation and the other instrument 
being used.
Another construct studied with the Stroop Test is 
cognition. Studies examining possible relationships 
between its scores and cognition include cognitive con­
trol studies, discussed above, and other research.
Jensen and Rohwer (1966) found no significant relation­
ship between color naming speed and intelligence, nor 
between flexibility scores and intelligence. He did, 
however, find a significant correlation between word 
naming and intelligence (p < .01).
Wheeler (1977) studied brain functioning involved 
in the interference-flexibility scores. He found that 
when college students were asked to respond with pushing 
buttons instead of silent or audible verbal responses, 
the Stroop Test interference reaction disappeared! 
Moreover, this occurred with usage of either hand. This 
researcher and others (e.g., MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; 
Nealis, 1973) note the competition of tasks involved in
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creating the "novel" situation— the third Stroop task 
must involve conflict along a dimension of meaning in 
order for a new type of processing to occur. The con­
flict comes in responding to the color of the ink used 
for a word versus the meaning of the word itself. 
Individual responses to this processing results in dif­
ferences in flexibility scores. When used according to 
the manual's directions, the Stroop Test produces sig­
nificant interference scores— even when answers are 
unspoken (Wheeler, 1977).
While the Wheeler (1977) study explored using 
dominant versus non-dominant hands, others have looked to 
investigating differences between the hemispheres them­
selves. Koenig (1989), using 108 right-handed males of 
7 - 1 5  years of age, found that there was a right-visual 
field advantage for all age groups.
Exploring the hemispheres introduces advances in 
the practice and research of the Stroop Test in the area 
of neuropsychology. Its value as part of a thorough 
neuropsychological battery is recognized at Crownsville 
Hospital Center in Maryland and other providers of mental 
health care services.
The Stroop Test's contribution to the battery is 
its acknowledged reflection of frontal lobe processing—  
that area associated with higher reasoning functions. 
Frontal dysfunction differences between those with 
schizophrenic versus affective (depressive and/or manic-
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depressive) processes were studied by Tal (1989) and 
Todd (1989). Both studies indicated that these disorders 
showed significant frontal lobe dysfunction as measured 
by the Stroop Test and other instrumentation.
Other neuropsychological research comes under 
topics of memory (Pickering, 1990) and cognitive inhibi­
tion (Beech, 1990), and general studies of brain dysfunc­
tion diagnosis (e.g.. Das, 1970; Golden, 1978; Ferret, 
1974) . The Stroop Test, therefore, is used as one mea­
sure of higher reasoning within the context of normal 
brain functioning.
Of interest in all psychological/neuropsychologi­
cal testing, Sheehan, Donovan, and MacLeod (1988) note 
that the Stroop interference effect is "notoriously 
difficult to modulate". Under hypnosis, they found that 
the Stroop effect increased. However, when the role of 
the hypnotist included assisting the subject in focusing 
attention on the novel task, those highly susceptible to 
hypnosis showed a sharp reduction of the Stroop effect, 
whereas those with lower susceptibility experienced only 
slight reduction of the effect.
Other areas studied include creativity, where 
Golden (1978) found a significant relationship between 
creativity and scores on the Stroop Test. Additional 
studies include drug-related research (Hooker & Jones, 
1987; McKeon, 1986; Ragade, 1990), autonomic nervous 
system (Frankenhaeuser et al., 1967; Houston, 1969; Oken
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et al., 1962; Regard, 1983), hormone levels (Franken­
haeuser et al., 1967), interactions with nutrition (Nayak 
& Dash, 1987; Channon, Hensley, & deSilva, 1988) and many 
more. The Stroop Test has been used with varying popula­
tions (e.g., Hama & Hashimoto, 1985; Karchmer, 1981; 
Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezie, 1986; Yamazaki, 1985) 
and under varying conditions (e.g., Connor, Franzen, & 
Sharp, 1988; Hugdahl & Franzor, 1987; MacKinnon, Geisel- 
man, & Woodward, 1985; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; Sheehan, 
Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988; Smith & Broadbent, 1985; Wil­
liams, & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Nultry, 1986), and 
by researchers from several fields of investigation.
There is a Chinese (Ji & Jiao, 1987) and a German 
version of the Stroop Test (Hunger, Leplow, & Kleim,
1987) , and a substantial number of modified Stroop tests 
(Cook, Jones, & Johnston, 1989; Foreman, Barraclough, 
Moore, & Mehta, 1989; Hayashi, 1988; Mogg, Mathews, & 
Weinman, 1989; Richards & Millwood, 1989) used in pain, 
anxiety, and a myriad of other research interests.
Continuing research also considers the Stroop 
effect itself, hypothesizing about the factors and pro­
cesses involved (Franzen, 1989; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; 
Panek, 1985).
Established usage of the instrument supported 
utilization in this study. It does not, however, 
replace reliability and validity data (see Chapter 3).
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Moral Reasoning
There is much current research and theory for­
mulation within the area of moral development, reasoning, 
and behavior. In view of the great quantity of existing 
studies, and in relation to the proposed paradigm, this 
researcher focuses on moral reasoning theory and research 
employing the DIT. Moral reasoning must be defined, 
explored in terms of pertinent research, and described in 
terms of the Defining Issues Test.
Defined
As mentioned earlier (see page 6), moral reason­
ing involves those kinds of operations using cognitive 
components to make decisions regarding the "right" and 
"wrong" of behaviors.
Many theorists and researchers have explored 
moral reasoning and incorporated the concept in studies, 
educational theories (e.g., Blakeney & Blakeney, 1990; 
DeVuyst, 1989; Gielen, 1987; Vokey, 1990); other theories 
(e.g., Wilson, 1990), and philosophies. Early work with 
moral reasoning includes Baldwin's writings (published at 
the turn of the century) and Piaget's work (published 
1932) (Boom, 1989) both of whom focused on cognition and 
development. Also using a cognitive-developmental ap­
proach, Kohlberg researched the concept using justice as 
a basis for moral reasoning (1958, 1986).
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A summation of Kohlberg*s theory
Kohlberg researched and authored much of the 
current theory on moral reasoning. He fully admits that 
he never considered that his work would represent a 
universal theory; he also declared that he himself was 
not an example of his highest stage of moral maturity!
His dissertation, "The Development of Modes of Moral 
Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (1958) is but 
one exposition of his model development and research.
Kohlberg's research and theorizing developed from 
his questioning of an earlier event in which he was 
involved. During a lecture in Tokyo he spoke of his 
experiences in illegally transporting Jews to post-World 
War II Israel and the questions he had regarding all 
areas of human dignity and justice. Kohlberg stated that 
"Equal respect for human dignity seemed to me the essence 
of justice" (1986, p. 6). Within his dissertation he 
described six moral types, evaluating them by eight 
characteristics (values, choice, sanction, negative 
standards or rules, self-image and role, authority, con­
tent, and justice).
These types or stages can be outlined as follows 
(parentheses identify labels used in his 1958 disserta­
tion) :
Level I: Premoral (Premoral Level)
Stage 1 punishment and obedience 
(heteronomous type)




Level II: Conventional (Generalized Conformity
Level)
Stage 3 "good boy/good girl"
("good boy" orientation)
Stage 4 law and order
(type 3)
Level III: Principle (Autonomous Level)
Stage 5 social contract
(democratic legalists)
Stage 6 universal ethical principles
(conscience)
Kohlberg (197 3) later suggested a seventh stage, 
but full development and inclusion of this stage never 
occurred. Carter (1987) claims that this Kohlbergian 
stage shifts the emphasis from justice to agape love and 
an understanding of the cosmic perspective. Carter, 
however, argues that Kohlberg's stage seven is the 
foundation of all moral stages— not a stage higher and 
separable from preceding stages.
Kohlberg reported (1986) that over 50 cross- 
cultural studies had produced the following: stages one
through four are found in most societies, and stage five 
is found in urban societies with sophisticated systems of 
education, rather than in less-sophisticated societies.
Prior to his death, Kohlberg lectured, worked for 
the development of democratic programs in high schools, 
and did other important work within the moral reasoning 
field. While he admitted that he was still learning from
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experience, he claimed that, "I'm beginning to think I 
have something to say" (1986, p. 10).
Theoretical additions to Kohlberg
Gilligan's theory (Brabeck, 1987; Conn, 1987; 
Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan, Ward, Taylor, & 
Bardige, 1989; Sprinthall, 1987), supplementing 
Kohlberg*s, suggests that subjective attachment proves a 
more appropriate basis of evaluating moral maturity for 
the female population. She further asserts that there 
are different moralities and moral psychologies between 
the sexes (Brabeck, 1987). Gielen (1987), however, 
asserts that Gilligan's work overlooked statistical 
information. Gielen cites Thoma and Rest's (1985) analy­
sis of 6,000 subjects from 56 DIT studies which clearly 
fails to support Gilligan's allegations.
Brabeck (1987) cites meta-analysis, longitudinal 
research, and reviews (e.g., Brabeck, 1983) in countering 
the sex bias claim, instead stating that any noted dif­
ferences exist due to differences in educational and work 
experience in the samples.
This area of inquiry remains controversial and 
under continued research. Sprinthall (1987), however, 
anticipates that an increasing "thaw" of the definition 
of morality will incorporate the information and orienta­
tion of Gilligan.
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Joy represents one of several theorists, rather 
than researchers, who build new perspectives on 
Kohlberg's foundations (Joy, 1983) and/or view his ideas 
from a different perspective. While Joy agrees that 
justice is the basis for moral reasoning, he adds to 
Kohlberg's structure the concepts of (1) noumenal func­
tion, (2) God, (3) faith, and (4) the acceptance of 
"evil" in individuals. Joy, however, questions the 
equating of immorality with underdevelopment. Instead, 
he theorizes that morality exists apart from God and that 
the inclusion of free will necessitates the understanding 
of moral failure. This Wesleyan curriculum planner is 
but one of several theorists to re-formulate Kohlbergian 
theory.
Schmidt (1983), speaking from a Lutheran perspec­
tive, is less generous with Kohlberg. Schmidt claims 
that Kohlberg has become a substitute for the gospel, and 
as such he is an "offense." He also points out the need 
for recognizing motivation for moral reasoning; he cites 
the gospel as such a force.
Such a supernatural power is in Moore's analysis 
(1983). She cites perception and knowledge from God as 
energizers, and she further points out that Kohlberg's 
work considers only thinking, apparently omitting feeling 
and doing. Moving beyond Kohlberg, Sholl (1983) proposes 
that Christian relational strengths constitute a more 
appropriate basis for moral reasoning than justice.
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Because of the nature of the moral reasoning construct, 
these perspectives provide material for interesting 
dialogue.
The religious background of these theorists does 
suggest, however, an underlying theme of addition— that 
of the power behind moral reasoning. Perhaps many of the 
contentions above spring from Kohlberg's views on the 
progressive and innately motivated development of moral' 
reasoning. Is Kohlberg, indeed, naive in his assumption? 
Does the omission of God present insurmountable difficul­
ties in his theory? The theorists above provide addi­
tional perspectives and possible extensions of Kohlber­
gian conceptualizations.
This study focused on moral reasoning, which 
innately involves a cognitive operation, rather than on 
behavior. Moreover, a striving for growth is considered 
inborn with natural and supernatural influences towards 
development, tempered by experience and choice. As such, 
this researcher asserts that Kohlberg's theory remains an 
adequate foundation for instrumentation.
Possible addendums are acknowledged. For 
example, Turiel (cited in Thomas, 1989), Gert (cited in 
Thomas, 1989), Gilligan (cited in Brabeck, 1987; Conn, 
1987; Gilligan & Attanuci, 1988; Killen, 1987; Thomas, 
1989), Perry (Thomas, 1989), and Rest (see below), are 
just some of the other theorists and/or researchers who 
add to the ideas offered by Kohlberg.
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While these individuals theorize, research, 
write, and have their varied critics and supporters, some 
moral reasoning analysts claim that these individuals 
need not compete with each other. Nor do they negate one 
another's work. Instead, they merely add dimensions and 
emphases to Kohlbergian theory (e.g., Sprinthall, 1987). 
Their theories and possible delimitations of the Kohlber­
gian foundation of the DIT, therefore, are not considered 
to be limitations to this research.
Rest * s contributions to 
moral reasoning
In addition to developing the Defining Issues 
Test, James Rest has researched and/or authored articles, 
books, and sections of books on moral reasoning. Rest 
explored the hierarchical nature of moral reasoning, the 
components of moral reasoning, and the development of an 
instrument different from Kohlberg's interview.
Rest's research (1973) supported the hierarchical 
nature of moral reasoning. He used the DIT, with 
Kohlberg's interview as a pre-testing instrument. Rest 
found that a level of comprehension of statements tended 
to cluster around a particular stage, that comprehension 
of moral statements was cumulative (subjects understood 
those statements from previous stages— that comprehension 
increased without taking away understanding of previous 
stages), and that comprehension fell progressively with 
stages of higher moral reasoning. Rest, Turiel, and
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Kohlberg (1969) found significantly higher comprehension 
of one stage rather than two stages above an individual's 
reasoning (based on Kohlberg Interview).
In addition. Rest reports that responses to the 
four dilemmas, rated in respect to Kohlbergian stages, 
showed statistically significant age discrimination on 
stages one through four (Carroll & Rest, 1981). Inter­
estingly, the study also found a rejection of lower 
stages with increasing age. Obviously this involved more 
than an aspect of moral reasoning comprehension.
Rest (Rest, 1973; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969) 
explains moral reasoning in terms of preference and 
comprehension. Comprehension sets the upper limits of 
moral reasoning; preference sets the lower limits of 
moral reasoning acceptable to the individual. Rest's 
(1973) research supports both concepts within a develop­
mental f ramework.
Corresponding to these components of moral rea­
soning, Rest's model involves four processes: (1) moral
evaluation, (2) interpretation of morally relevant situa­
tions, (3) setting priorities (the first three reflecting 
the usage of cognitive mosaics), and (4) implementation 
of plan of action (Gielen, 1987). He states that the DIT 
focuses on moral evaluation among these processes.
Beyond these contributions. Rest developed the 
Defining Issues Test— a test shown to be more than just 
another variant of Kohlberg's interview (Davison &
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Robbins, 1978). The Defining Issues Test consists of six 
vignettes designed to measure moral reasoning. The 
instrument can be given to large groups of individuals, 
with each individual rating and ranking statements per­
taining to the vignettes. The scores provide a group 
stage profile, a consistency check, two indices of moral 
judgment development, and other information depending on 
the needs of the researcher.
While research (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & 
Anderson, 1974) showed a correlation (r = .68) between 
the DIT and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and 
although both claim to measure the same construct, the 
DIT is a unique instrument. It differs from Kohlberg's 
instrument in both methodology and on theoretical 
issues.
For instance, differences include usage of spon­
taneous (Kohlberg) versus standardized statements (DIT), 
subjective researcher scorings (Kohlberg) versus objec­
tive researcher scorings (DIT), labeling (Kohlberg) 
versus overall index of moral maturity (DIT), no validity 
measure (Kohlberg) versus the M check (DIT), and other 
contrasts which clearly support the individuality of the 
DIT— a uniqueness supported by other researchers.
Related studies involving the DIT
In addition to studies mentioned earlier, other 
research includes exploration of moral reasoning, as
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defined by the Defining Issues Test, and cognitive/ 
personality constructs.
One such study explored the relationship between 
Piagetian cognitive stages and moral development in 
adolescents in a necessary but not sufficient hypothesis 
(Howard, 1986). In this case a necessary but not suffi­
cient relationship means that cognitive development must 
reach certain Piagetian cognitive levels in order for 
certain levels of moral reasoning to potentially develop. 
The "potential" term refers to the fact that the level of 
cognitive development is not the only factor involved in 
higher moral development. Cognitive development is 
necessary but not sufficient to produce higher moral 
development. Their hypothesis held for the formal opera­
tional, but not for the concrete operational stage among 
adolescents (scores from instruments measuring cognitive 
factors did not significantly predict moral reasoning 
scores).
Couch (1986) examined this same assumption using 
a deaf population with mixed results. Similarly, other 
studies (Adams, 1987; Weiss, 1986) show mixed results 
depending on the instrumentation and focus of study.
Studies comparing the DIT and IQ found correla­
tions as high as .60's and .70's (Rest, 1979); however, 
the studies above do not support equating moral reasoning 
with cognition. In other words, cognition does not 
explain nor account for moral reasoning. It merely
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supports the understanding of a necessary but not suffi­
cient relationship between cognition and moral reasoning. 
This study, was concerned with an interaction between the 
value and cognitive subsystems, and not just the cogni­
tive subsystem itself.
Of a practical nature, Schaefli, Rest, and Thoma, 
(1985) used the DIT to explore various methods of moral 
reasoning training. Using junior/senior high school, 
college/graduate students, and other adults, they found 
that dilemma discussion and psychological development 
programs of 3 - 12 weeks produced significant increases 
in moral reasoning. They found that social studies and 
humanities courses did not show this effect. Of the 
programs that did work, it worked best with those 24 
years of age and older.
Along the lines of training, some research has 
addressed moral reasoning among therapists— one of the 
experiences which prompted this study. For instance. 
Reeves, Bowman, and Cooley (1989) explored the relation­
ship between client's moral reasoning level and the 
empathy expressed by counseling students. They found 
that higher moral reasoning counseling students showed 
significantly higher empathy responses to lower versus 
higher moral reasoning client statements.
The moral reasoning of both the client and the 
counselor, therefore, is related to the amount of empathy
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exhibited by the counselor. Due to the nature of the 
study, unfortunately, it cannot be said that high moral 
reasoning is a prerequisite to high empathy responses.
Fortunately, however, Curtis, Billingslea, and 
Wilson, (1988) used the California Psychological Inven­
tory Empathy and Socialization scales, a questionnaire 
which rated types of authority, and the DIT with 105 
undergraduates. They found that subjects obtaining high 
empathy and socialization scores also exhibited higher 
moral reasoning. They also report that the individuals 
with higher moral reasoning tended to visualize author­
ity/ "authority figures" in a negative manner. These 
statements will prove important in the applications of 
this study in Chapter 5.
Authority and related implications have also been 
an issue of discussion/debate within the area of reli­
gion. Cullman (1989) hypothesized that more mature 
individuals will express less need for formal religion. 
Her research hypothesis was supported— religiousity was 
negatively correlated with psychological maturity as 
measured by the DIT, Religious Belief-Behavior Question­
naire, Bond Defense Style Questionnaire, and Valliant's 
Semi-structured Interview Schedule. Religiousity was 
found to be an important factor in both moral and emo­
tional maturity. Cullman even suggested that religious­
ity may hinder maturity.
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Some individuals have questioned the usage of the 
DIT instrument with certain religious populations. They 
charge that the DIT is biased so that individuals within 
these populations receive lower moral reasoning scores. 
The question is valid. Buier, Butman, Burwell, and Van 
Wicklin (1989), however, report that norms of both a 
cross-sectional and longitudinal nature at three Chris­
tian colleges were within general college DIT norms.
Looking not at just the population, but at an 
evaluation of the items on the DIT, Richards (1989) 
explored the test using 833 members of a Mormon church 
and 822 general population subjects. Richards reports 
that his interpretation suggests that 25 out of the 72 
DIT items are biased for this population and that this 
population scored within low moral reasoning P score (the 
P score uses just moral reasoning stage 5 and 6 respon­
ses) ranges on the DIT. However, when these items were 
removed, the P score differences did not fully disappear.
In support of the DIT, Richards did not find any 
difference between the Mormon versus other subject popu­
lation on the D score (the D score is a weighted combina­
tion of all moral reasoning stage responses) of the DIT. 
It is important to note that he feels that the D score 
does not underestimate the moral reasoning of this con­
servative religious group. Current literature appears to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
favor usage of the D score on the DIT. This research 
adds further empirical support of this usage.
Other studies examined locus of control 
(Bloomberg, 1974; Carey, 1990; Howard, 1986), the 
relationships between dimensions of psychopathology 
(Hunter, 1985; Mohr, 1987), parent socialization 
(Alvarez, 1986; Finn, 1978; Forder, 1973), affect (Aron, 
1972, Conn, 1987; Sturtevant, 1986), self-concept (Kelly. 
& Choven, 1985), education (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987; 
Blumenfeld, Pintrich, & Hamilton, 1987; Bouhmama, 1988; 
Bowman & Allen, 1988; Gfellner, 1986; James, 1984; 
Johnston & Lubomudrov, 1987; Keith, 1987; Kuhmerker,
1988; Okatahi & Parish, 1987; Rest, 1987; Shaver, 1987; 
Thoma & Rest, 1987) , culture and/or race (Boyes & Walker, 
1988; Locke & Tucker, 1988; Moon, 1986; Zeidner, 1988), 
and other personality and/or cognitive dimensions 
(Harris, Mussen, & Rutherford, 1976; Lawrence, 1987; Page 
& Handley, 1988). These studies comprise just a limited 
listing of research conducted with a wide variety of 
populations.
The studies cited above, in general, do not 
involve moral reasoning in a personality paradigm. They 
are concerned, instead, with describing populations in 
terms of moral reasoning, relationships of moral reason­
ing to major, isolated constructs, and analyzing methods
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of training. As such, however, they provide foundational 
knowledge regarding constructs in the proposed paradigm.
The area of moral reasoning remains popular and 
the review above represents an overview of the areas 
under investigation and those of relevance to the 
research.
Summary of Literature Review and 
Theoretical Background
Related research and theoretical work supports 
choice of the DIT and the Stroop Color and Word Test for 
use within the proposed study. Beyond support of these 
instruments, this background confirmed the promise of the 
proposed paradigm and the relevance of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
This chapter details the methodology, design, and 
null hypotheses of this study.
Methodology
The research explored a tentative paradigm in 
terms of the relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and moral reasoning. This study focused, however, on the 
empirical exploration. The following sections reflect 
this organization.
Sampling
Sampling consisted of intact groups— voluntary 
subjects from college classes. This method is justified 
based on the emphasis of the study— the interest lay in 
the relationship between two instruments/constructs and 
not in any particular population. While descriptive data 
are included, it is as additional information with noted 
limitations.
With these considerations, acceptability of the 
sampling methods is assumed.
6 5
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Instrumentation
The research utilized the six-story version of 
the DIT and the Stroop Color and Word Test. Since the 
instruments have already been described and related 
research has been explored above, the following sections 
are concerned only with the reliability and validity of 
these tests.
The reliabilitv and validity 
of the Stroop Test
While literature shows varied administrations and 
scorings. Golden (1978) published and established a 
standard usage of the instrument. In addition, there 
have been reliability and validity studies which speak to 
the credibility of the Stroop Test.
Jensen (1965) reports test-retest reliabilities 
of .88, .79, and .71 on the word score, color score, and 
color-word task scores, respectively. Administration of 
the Stroop Test to a group of subjects yielded test- 
retest results of .89, .84, and .73 (M = 450) and 
individual administration results of .86, .82, and .73 
(N = 30) in Golden's study (1975) .
Supporting this. Golden reported reliabilities of 
.85, .81, and .69 (H = 60) for subjects' scores on 
individual and group administered tests. This finding 
suggests the practical and reliable alternative of group 
administration to the individual administration method.
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thus supporting this aspect of the methodology used in 
this study.
Validity data consist of content validity and 
factor analysis studies which support the flexibility 
construct and the Stroop Test as a measure of that.
Content validity exists primarily in the inher­
ent nature of the task presented by the Stroop Test — the 
instrument demands that the subject create a response in 
order to process a novel situation. This very task 
defines flexibility. Beyond this definition of the 
process, the behavioral descriptors of those classified 
by the Stroop Test as constricted, and the comparision of 
Stroop Test results on other personality/cognition tests 
(see Chapter 2, pages 40-49) provide a supportive nomeno- 
logical net for both the construct and the Stroop Test.
Factor analysis studies show three factors of 
interference, word, and color (Golden, 1978; Jensen, 
1965). Golden's analysis of the Stroop Test tasks fac­
tored out three factors, one of which was identified and 
labeled as an interference factor— a factor with non-sig­
nificant loadings from word and color-naming scores.
This factor, measured by the Stroop Test interference 
score, does not duplicate measurement of word reading or 
color naming abilities. Instead, this interference score 
reflects a previously unexperienced demand for a dif­
ferential processing organization.
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This processing is seen as the selection of an 
appropriate mosaic (it is believed that this selection 
actually involves the creation of a mosaic for this 
unique task). The Stroop interference score measures 
flexibility verus inflexibility in terms of the ability 
to do this Stroop Test task relative to the other task 
scores. This study classifies this selection as cogni­
tive flexibility within a cognitive mosaic repertoire. 
Golden's study, therefore, supports the measurement of 
flexibility as an ability separate from reading/naming 
abilities, and supports the Stroop Test as a valid mea­
sure of this study's definition of cognitve flexiblity.
Thus, reliability and validity information sup­
ports the Stroop Color and Word Test as a research 
instrument. Killian (in Test Critiques. 1985) not only 
considers the Stroop Test as highly valid and reliable 
but suggests that the instrument be included in the basic 
psychological battery. The construct measured by this 
instrument, flexibility, finds support in research and 
conceptualizations within personality theory and related 
fields of study.
The reliabilitv and validitv 
of the PIT
Test-retest studies (Davison & Robbins, 1978) 
yield .70 and .80 reliability coefficients for the over­
all index of moral judgment development (P) . The stage
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scores, in contrast, show reliabilities in the .50's and 
,60's (Rest, 1986). The DIT manual recommends use of 
stage scores only within context of group means and when 
using the six-story version of the DIT. Davison and 
Robbins (1978) obtained alpha coefficients of internal 
consistency .71 to .82.
The publishers note that the DIT offers objective 
scoring— the researcher merely works with the rankings 
given by the subject. This characteristic shows consis­
tency of measurement with the six-story version. How­
ever, it does not support the validity of the instrument.
The Mental Measurement Yearbook claims that "a 
wide variety of evidence attests to the DIT's validity" 
(Vol. 9, p. 441). Studies examining concurrent validity 
with other moral reasoning measurements (e.g.. Rest et 
al., 1974) report correlations up to the .70's. In 
contrast, researchers report non-significant correlation 
with non-moral mental development. This information 
supports the construct measured by the instrument.
In addition to P and D scores, the DIT offers a 
validity check. Moreover, McGeorge (1975) found college 
students were unable to fake good reasoning.
The DIT shows additional validity through lon- 
gitudinal-change studies (e.g., Davison & Robbins, 1978) 
which show subjects giving higher importance to higher 
stage moral issues over time. This contrasts with
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studies showing nonsignificant results from moral educa­
tion programs (Rest, 1979). Their ineffectiveness, 
however, does not detract from other significant findings 
relating to the validity of the DIT nor does it influence 
this research.
Contesting the validity of the DIT, two main 
studies looked to (1) a language sophistication or (2) an 
action dimension as an explanation of scores on the DIT 
rather than moral reasoning. The first, proposed by 
Moran and Joniak (cited in Rest, 1980), claimed that the 
DIT merely reflected preference for more sophisticated 
language with age.
Rest (1980) countered with claims that (1) the 
researchers used incorrect age groups for such a study,
(2) that earlier studies using restatement measurements 
showed an emphasis on meaning rather than sophistication,
(3) that the DIT uses a validity check which weeds out 
responses to pretentious statements, and (4) very few 
subjects reach the highest stages.
Researchers equating the DIT with an action 
orientation (Martin, Shafto & Van Deinse, 1977) report 
that in two of six stages they found that a decision­
making construct correlated more closely with age than 
the DIT P score. Interpreted, this means that subjects' 
responses appeared to be given based on decisions and not
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merely in terms of responses that seemed relatively more 
action-oriented than others.
Rest answered that (1) one cannot separate moral 
reasoning from behavior, (2) not all statements involve 
action, and (3) P does not use all stages for its score. 
Cooper (1972), in turn, found a correlation of .34 bet­
ween action and P scores. In other words, moral reason­
ing is related, but certainly not reduced, to action.
Of particular interest to this study, Buier, 
Butman, Burwell, and Wicklin (1989) found no significant 
differences between scores at three Christian colleges 
versus general college norms on the DIT. While Richards 
(1989) reports that the P score is biased for a Mormon 
population (see page 63), he found that the D score did 
not underestimate the moral reasoning of this conserva­
tive religious group. As mentioned above, this study 
focused on the relationship between the two tests and not 
on the populations. With this focus and the results of 
these studies in mind, it is believed that the DIT proves 
valid for the religous college population used in this 
research.
The validity research, in addition to reliability 
findings, supports the usage of the DIT. The significant 
amount of usage of the instrument in current studies and 
the reviews and research corroborate the acceptance of 
the DIT for moral reasoning assessment.
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Procedure fAdministration)
1. Each subject received a cover letter which 
described the voluntary nature of the experiment and the 
methods used to protect anonymity.
2. Those subjects volunteering (no prospective 
students declined) to participate took both the Stroop 
Test and the DIT— half of the subjects took the Stroop 
Test first, the other half took the DIT first. This 
controlled for treatment interaction effects on validity.
3. The subjects heard standardized instructions 
regarding general testing procedures. This included the 
protection of anonymity which was ensured with the use of 
numbers. Included on the top sheet of the first testing 
materials was a removable, colored slip with an identify­
ing number. This number coincided with a number written 
on the pages of the instrument itself. The subjects were 
instructed to keep this number in a place of their choice 
until the next test was given. The subjects were told to 
write in this number on the second set of materials given 
to them.
4. The subjects heard the standardized instruc­
tion included in test manuals for group administration, 
after receiving the appropriate materials.
5. Administration of the Stroop Test.
a. Each student received a stapled book­
let containing the three sheets.
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b. The subject was given standardized 
instructions before doing each task.
c. The student was asked to do each task 
silently, correcting mistakes.
d. Each task was timed for 45 seconds.
e. After calling "Stop", the subject was 
instructed to circle the word that he 
was reading at the time.
f. The student was instructed to turn to 
the next sheet of the booklet. 
Instructions b through f were 
repeated.
6. Administration of the DIT.
a. Each subject received a booklet 
containing written instructions and 
six dilemmas.
b. Instructions were given as outlined 
by the DIT manual.
c. The subject was given 50 minutes to 
complete the instrument.
d. Manual instructions were followed
in answering questions from subjects.
7. Subjects were debriefed and questions
answered.
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Procedure fPost-Administration^
1. Raw data from the DIT were sent to the 
Center for the Study of Ethical Development.
2. Data from the Stroop Test were hand-scored 
as prescribed by the manual's formulas.
3. Prior to statistical analysis, each subject 
was checked for acceptability. A subject was discarded 
if:
a. there was a raw score of 8 or above 
on the M scale of the DIT;
b. there were more than eight errors in 
a single story and/or more than two 
stories with inconsistencies on the 
DIT;
c. the color naming was equal to or 
greater than word-naming score on the 
Stroop;
d. the color-word score on the Stroop 
was equal to or greater than either 
the word naming or color naming 
score;
e. the color-word score on the Stroop 
was below 20; or
f. the researcher noted that the subject 
used more than a 45-degree rotation 
of the Stroop Test papers.
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Statistical Analysis 
The analysis focused on the differences in fre­
quency between those subject scores in certain categories 
of moral reasoning and cognitive flexibility. A chi- 
square analysis was used to test the null hypotheses.
For the test of each hypothesis the value of alpha was 
set at .05 on a one-tailed test. In addition, descrip­
tive data were analyzed and presented.
Statement of Null Hypotheses
1. Among those subjects with a P score of 35- 
46 on the DIT, there will fail to be a signifi­
cantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility 
scores above the sample median than below the 
median.
2. Among those subjects with a D score of 21- 
27 on the DIT, there will fail to be a signifi­
cantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility 
scores above the sample median than below the 
median.
3. Among those subjects with a P score of 47 
or higher on the DIT, there will fail to be a 
significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexi­
bility scores above the sample median than 
below the median.
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4. Among those subjects with a D score of 28 
or higher on the DIT, there will fail to be a 
significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexi­
bility scores above the sample median than 
below the median.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports and interprets the data 
gathered from a sample of freshman and sophomore students 
from two coastal eastern and western colleges in North 
America.
Description of the Sample 
The sample initially included 168 subjects. 
Rejections based on Stroop's manual (see post-administra­
tion procedures in Chapter 3) amounted to 27 subjects.
No rejections were made based on the DIT's M rating; how­
ever, 8 additional rejections were based on the DIT's 
consistency check.
The resulting sample included 13 3 subjects.
La Sierra College students comprised 99 of this number; 
the remaining 34 subjects were students at Columbia Union 
College. This bi-coastal sample consisted of 68 (51.1%) 
females and 65 (48.9%) males. Their mean age was 18.99 
years with a range of 17 to 40 years of age.
Table 1 describes general sample characteristics 
on the Stroop Test and DIT. The cognitive flexibility 
and moral reasoning P and D score percentages
77
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Table 1
StrooD Test and PIT scores
Category Mean Range SD
Stroop Test Scores 47.518 29.000-70.000 5.008
DIT Scores
P 40.585 6.700-75.000 6.203
D 23.537 7.025-40.400 2.889
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appear in Figures 5 and 6. As mentioned earlier, these 
are quartile groupings suggested by the DIT manual for 
use in research. A directional chi-square analysis and 
other varied descriptive analyses were completed on the 
sample. The chi-square test was to be used to compare 
observed and expected frequencies of flexible/not flexi­
ble individuals as measured by the Stroop Test within 
each of the upper two quartile groupings on the DIT. To- 
obtain the expected frequences required for the chi- 
square necessitated using the median rather than the mean 
as the division point between flexible and not flexible 
individuals. The following sections detail the results.
Description of the Data
The frequencies of scores on the DIT and the 
Stroop Color and Word Test formed the basis for testing 
the null hypotheses. In particular, rejection or failure 
to reject the null hypotheses depended on the frequency 
of more flexible (above the median score on the Stroop 
Test for the sample) versus less flexible (below the 
median score on the Stroop Test for the sample) and 
scores within the two upper quadrants of DIT scores. 
Further description of the data is given in terms of this 
relationship.
Table 2 gives the mean, range, and standard 
deviation of the data for the sample, as broken down by 
both the flexible-inflexible classification ("OF"
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P QUARTILE GROUPING FREQUENCIES
ABOVE THE THIRD 
QUARTILE POINT; 11.28%
LOWER TWO QUARTILE 
GROUPINGS: 54.89
BETWEEN THE SECOND AND 
THIRD QUARTILE POINTS: 33.83%
Figure 5. Percentages of the sample receiving scores in 
the different P quartile groupings on the DIT.
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D QUARTILE GROUPING FREQUENCIES
THE THIRD 
QUARTILE POINT: 18.80%
LOWER TWO QUARTILE 
GROUPINGS: 42.11 BETWEEN THE SECOND AND 
THIRD QUARTILE POINTS : 39.10%
Figure 6. Percentages of the sample receiving scores in 
the different D quartile groupings on the DIT.
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Tabl# 2
StrooD Test and PIT Statistics Per Cognitive Flexibility 
and Moral Reasoning Levalm
F to ib is  Not FWmlW#
( > 48 on the stroop Test) ( < 48 on the Stroop Test) 
U#«m Rang* SO Uaan Rang# SO
Above the Third Quartile Point on D Score
CF: 63.714 4 6 .0 -4 2 .0  6.306 CF: 41 .727 3 6 .0 -4 7 .0  2.273
0; 33.036 2 7 .6 -4 0 .4  3.663 0: 20.673 27 .6  36 .0  2.166
Between the Second and Third Quartile Points on D Score
CF: 63.670 4 6 .0 -7 0 .0  4 .616 OF: 36 .227 2 6 .0 -4 7 .0  6.664
0: 23.663 21 .4 -2 6 .3  1.647 0: 22 .660 2 0 .6 -2 7 .0  2.146
Below the Second Quartile Point
CF: 36.600 4 6 .0 -6 6 .0  4 .766  CF: 41.662 2 0 .0 -4 7 .0  6.616
0: 16.667 7 .0 2 -1 6 .6  3 .336 0: 16.776 0 7 .6 -1 6 .4  4.163
Above the Third Quartile Point on P Score
CF: 63.000 4 6 .0 -6 2 .0  6 .607 CF: 36 .600 2 6 .0 -4 6 .0  6.646
P: 64.740 4 6 .7 -7 6 .0  6 .014  P: 61 .620 46 .7  60 .0  10.120
Between the Second and Third Quartile Points on P Score 
CF: 64.262 4 6 .0 -6 4 .0  4 .662  CF: 43 .265 26 .0  46 .0  6.201
P: 40.450 3 6 .0 -4 5 .0  3.656 P. 36.766 3 6 .0 -4 6 .0  2.663
Below the Second Quartile Point
CF: 64.623 4 6 .0 -7 0 .0  4 .656  CF: 40.031 2 6 .0 -4 6 .0  5.156
P: 26.310 0 6 .7 -3 3 .0  6.720 P: 24.026 0 5 .0 -3 3 .0  6.421
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represents cognitive flexibility) and the D and P scores 
C'D" and "P" in Table 2) of the DIT.
An individual's score in relation to the sample 
median on the Stroop Test operationally defines the 
flexibile-inflexible classification. Those above the 
median (greater than or equal to a score of 48 for this 
sample) were classified as flexible; those below the 
median (less than a score of 48 for this sample) were 
classified as inflexible.
Testing of the Hypotheses 
The results noted above give a general descrip­
tion of the sample. Analysis of the four null hypothe­
ses, however, necessitated testing the significance of 
frequency differences.
Using the median of the sample, the expected 
frequency of individuals above the median should be equal 
to the number below the median in the top two quartile 
groupings of both the DIT's P and D sample results. A 
one-tailed chi-square test was used to analyze the dif­
ferences between the expected frequencies and the 
observed, or actual, frequencies.
A one-tailed chi-square analysis requires a
correction factor in chi-square tables. A non- direc­
tional analysis with one degree of freedom with
p < .05 requires a chi-square of 3.84. Chi-square
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tables, however, work with a two-tailed model not 
directly applicable to directional analysis.
The hypotheses in this study look not only to 
significant differences in the frequencies, but also to 
the direction (direction here referring to flexible 
versus not flexible) of the greater frequencies. This 
makes the analysis directional. Corrections for this 
difference involve using the two-tailed, p < .10 chi- 
square of 2.71 instead of 3.84 for each of the hypotheses 
(Ferguson, 1981) . The reader will note that future 
references to p < .05 will represent a corrected chi- 
square figure for a directional test with one degree of 
freedom.
Hypothesis One
Among those subjects with a P score of 35-4 6 
(between the second and third quartile points) on the 
DIT, there will fail to be a significantly higher fre­
quency of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample 
median than below the median.
Table 3 shows descriptive data and the contin­
gency table information related to this hypothesis. Cal­
culation of a chi-square on the P scores in this range 
resulted in a chi-square of .20 with one degree of free­
dom and E > .05. This failed to meet the .05 statistical 
significance level. Thus null hypothesis one is 
retained. There are no significantly more flexible than
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Table 3
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis One
Number of subjects scoring between
the second and third quartile points on P
Subjects classified as "Flexible” 
Subjects classified as "Not Flexible" 








Stroop Test score Observed Expected (0-E) / E 
Above median > 4 8  24 22.5 0.1
Below median < 4 8  21 22.5 0.1
Chi-square =0.20; p > .05 non-significant finding
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inflexible individuals between the second and third 
quartile points on the P score of the DIT.
Hypothesis Two
Among those subjects with a D score of 21-27 
(between the second and third quartile points) on the 
DIT, there will fail to be a significantly higher 
frequency of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample 
median than below it.
Table 4 shows descriptive data and the contin­
gency table information related to this hypothesis. A 
chi-square of 3.50 with one degree of freedom and 
E < .05 were found for this range of scores which meets 
the .05 statistical signifance level. Thus null hypo­
thesis two is rejected. There are more flexible than 
inflexible individuals between the second and third 
quartile points on the D score of the DIT.
Hypothesis Three
Among those subjects with a P score of 47 or 
higher (above the third quartile point) on the DIT, there 
will fail to be a significantly higher frequency of 
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than 
below the median.
Table 5 shows descriptive data and the contin­
gency table information related to this hypothesis. 
Calculation of a chi-square on the P scores in this range
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Table 4
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Two
Number of subjects scoring between
the second and third quartile points on D
56
Subjects classified as "Flexible" 35
Subjects classified as "Not Flexible" 21
Mean of D scores
Flexible 23.89
Not flexible 22.88
Stroop Test score 
Above median > 48 









Chi-square = 3.50; p < .05; significant finding
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Table 5
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Three 
Number of subjects scoring above
the third quartile point on P 15
Subjects classified as "Flexible" 11
Subjects classified as "Not Flexible" 4
Mean of P scores
Flexible 51.62
Not flexible 54.74
Stroop Test score Observed Expected (0-E)^/ E 
Above median > 4 8  11 7.5 1.63
Below median < 4 8  4 7.5 1.63
Chi-square = 3.27; p < .05 significant finding
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resulted in a chi-square of 3.27 with one degree of 
freedom and e  < .05. This also meets the .05 statistical 
significance level. Thus the third null hypothesis is 
rejected. There are more flexible than inflexible 
individuals above the third quartile point on the P score 
of the DIT.
Hypothesis Four
Among those subjects with a D score of 28 or 
higher (above the third quartile point) on the DIT, there 
will fail to be a significantly higher frequency of 
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than 
below the median.
Table 6 shows descriptive data and the contin­
gency table information related to this hypothesis. The 
data in this range produced a chi-square of 0.36 with one 
degree of freedom and e > .05. Thus, null hypothesis 
four is retained. There are no more flexible than 
inflexible individuals above the third quartile point on 
the D score of the DIT.
Summary of Findings 
The second and third null hypotheses were 
rejected at the .05 level, thereby supporting the 
corresponding experimental hypotheses. However, the data 
failed to reject the first and fourth null hypotheses at 
the .05 level.
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Table 6
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Four 
Number of subjects scoring above
the third quartile point on D 25
Subjects classified as "Flexible" 14
Subjects classified as "Not Flexible" 11
Mean of D scores
Flexible 33.04
Not flexible 29.97
Stroop Test score Observed Expected (O-E)**/ E
Above median > 4 8  14 12.5 0.18
Below median < 4 8  11 12.5 0.18
Chi-square = 0.36; p > .05 non-significant finding
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Discussion
A review of the findings thus shows that the 
results support the second and third research hypotheses, 
but failed to support the first and fourth research 
hypotheses. To determine the significance of these 
results, it is necessary to explore these findings in 
terms of hypothesis interpretation and integration.
Support of the Second Hypothesis
Statistically significant findings on this hypo­
thesis means that among those with D scores between the 
second and third quartile points there were significantly 
more individuals classified as "flexible" than "not 
flexible." As stated previously, D scores represent a 
general index of moral reasoning maturity which is devel­
oped from a weighted formula of answers from stages one 
through six. In terms of the hypothesis, the results 
support the hypothesized necessary but not sufficient 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral 
reasoning.
Support of the Third Hypothesis
The results show a significantly greater fre­
quency of "flexible" versus "not flexible" individuals 
scoring above the third quartile point on the P index.
In contrast to the D score, the P score consists of a 
weighted formula using levels 5 and 6 of the DIT. More
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simply stated, these findings also support a necessary 
but not sufficient relationship between moral reasoning 
and cognitive flexibility.
Failure to support the First 
and Fourth Hypotheses
Analysis of these hypotheses failed to support 
the proposed necessary but not sufficient relationship 
for the scores between the second and third quartile 
points on the P score and above the third quartile point 
on the D score. However, the "trends" or "tendencies" in 
the data (the number of subjects and differences in moral 
reasoning means between flexible and inflexible groups—  
see Table 2 and Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10) lend informal 
support to these research hypotheses. The follow-up 
tests of the differences of means gave statistically sig­
nificant support to these same hypotheses.
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the cognitive flexi­
bility means ("CF") and the DIT P and D means ("P" and 
"D") for the lower two, third, and top groups determined 
by the DIT adapted quartile groupings.
In statistical support of the classification, 
"trend", directional t tests were used to analyze the P 
and D means of the top two quartile groupings. Each t 
test compared two means— the flexible versus the not 
flexible means on the P and D measures.































Lower groups Third Group Top Group 
D Score ------
Cognitive Flexibility Score ■ —
Figure 7 . D score and flexibility score means for the 
lower two (below the second quartile point), third 
(between the second and third quartile points), and 
fourth (above the third quartile point) quartile groups 
for those classified as "flexible".















Third. Group Top GroupLower groups
D Score ------
Cognitive Flexibility Score
Figure 8. D score and flexibility score means for the 
lower two (below the second quartile point), third 
(between second and third quartile points), and fourth 
(above the third quartile point) quartile groups for 
those classified as "not flexible".














Third Group Top GroupLower groups
P Score ——
Cognitive Flexibility Score
Figure 9. P score and flexibility score means for the 
lower two (below the second quartile point), third 
(between the second and third quartile points), and 
fourth (above the third quartile point) quartile groups 
for those classified as "flexible".














Third Group Top GroupLower groups
P Score —  —  —
Cognitive Flexibility Score
Figure 10. P score and flexibility score means for the 
lower two (below the second quartile point), third 
(between the second and third quartile point), and fourth 
(above the third quartile point) quartile groups for 
those classified as "not flexible".
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Table 7 shows the results of these analyses. The 
t test results on the data from hypotheses one and four, 
hypotheses not supported by the chi-square tests, 
indicate that the means on the moral reasoning measures 
were significantly higher for the flexible than for the 
not flexible subjects.
Chi-square analyses, chosen to test the hypo­
theses, were believed more probably to determine subtle 
differences between flexible and not flexible subjects. 
Differences in the means between the flexible/not flexi­
ble subjects on the D and P scores within the same quar­
tile groupings, moreover, was not anticipated. The 
interpretation of a necessary but not sufficient rela­
tionship rested on the number of flexible versus not 
flexible individuals who were in the higher moral reason­
ing groups. While chi-square tests best suited the 
hypotheses, it is believed that the t tests provide 
important additional statistical support for those hypo­
theses previously not supported.
It is the opinion of this researcher that the 
information just mentioned is both statistically sig­
nificant (although not with the test of choice for test­
ing hypotheses) and theoretically significant, especially 
when viewed in terms of support for all of the hypothe­
ses .
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Table 7
Hvpotheses-related Comparisons Between Flexible and 
Not Flexible Groups on P and D Scores
Hvoothesis Subjects Means Per Grouo Variance
First Flex 24 P = 40.45 12. 66
Not Flex 21 P = 38.78 d^= 8.90
t = 1.692 with 
directional
43 degrees of freedom 













t = 1.812 with 54 degrees of freedom in 
directional test, e < .05; Sig.
Flex 11
Not Flex 4




t = 0.580 with 13 degrees of freedom in 
directional test, e  < .05; Sig.
Flex 14
Not Flex 11




t = 2.502 with 23 degrees of freedom in 
directional test, e < .01; Sig.
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It is proposed that the results may be due to a 
lack of power in either the sensitivity of the chosen 
instruments or, more probably, in the relatively small 
number of subjects, both of which could lead to Type II 
errors. In terms of the fourth hypothesis, one would do 
well to look first to the usable sample size which was 
smaller than expected.
Ferguson (1988, pages 201-216) recommends a 
minimum expected frequency of 5 for each cell for a chi- 
square test. The sample size of 130 would normally give 
expected frequencies of close to 32.5 in each quartile 
grouping— paralleling that of the DIT norming samples.
As it turned out, however, the DIT distributions were 
very different (see Figures 5 and 6).
In the D score distribution 56 were above the 
second quartile point and 25 between the second and third 
quartile point. On the P scores, 45 were above the 
second quartile point and only 15 were between the second 
and third quartile points.
Therefore, while the overall number of subjects 
utilized exceeded statistical needs, lower frequencies 
were found than expected. This is an interesting point 
to note since the DIT uses adjusted quartile groupings 
(scores adjusted downward— see Chapter 3) to promote a 
more reasonable research spread than would be found in a 
mere quartile division of possible points in moral
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development scores. It may be that the testing situation 
induced stress, which in turn led to regressed scores. 
However, in view of the procedures and controls used, 
this possibility must remain highly speculative.
This lowering of scores may also reflect, in 
part, the findings of Cullman (1989) (see page 61). His 
report that the P score underestimated a conservative 
religious group, similar to that used in this study, may 
be seen in the lower number of subjects above the third 
quartile point on the P score.
While the first hypothesis did not depend on the 
lower frequencies to the extent found in the top quartile 
grouping, it is also suggested that sample size may have 
limited the power of this analysis. It may be that 
having higher frequencies for analysis would have 
increased the chances of finding subtle, yet important 
differences.
However, these statements do assume sufficiently 
sensitive testing instruments. While these instruments 
are believed to be the most sensitive and valid in cur­
rent usage, this does not necessarily mean that they have 
sufficient power to detect subtle but nevertheless 
important differences. Should an improved version of the 
instruments be available in the future, further inves­
tigation of this variable would certainly be warranted.
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If Type II errors have indeed occurred, it 
remains for other researchers to explore further the pos­
sibilities of undiscovered, confounding variables.
Integration of findings
The failure of the data to support two of the 
four hypotheses does not create contradictory interpreta­
tions for, as noted above, it appears that integration of 
the findings are not only possible, but are indeed mean­
ingful .
Integration of the two supported hypotheses with 
the "tendencies" mentioned previously of the other two 
hypotheses clearly supports a necessary but not suffi­
cient relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
moral reasoning. The significance and implications of 
this relationship follow in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Personality, a construct representing the dynamic 
integration of the individual, remains complicated, both 
in theory and in research. This study, while proposing a 
paradigm of one aspect of personality, primarily focused 
on the empirical exploration within that paradigm of the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral 
reasoning. To date, researchers had not related the 
Stroop Color and Word Test and the Defining Issues Test 
to moral reasoning.
The purpose of this study was to determine if 
there is a relationship between moral reasoning, as 
measured by the DIT, and cognitive flexibility, as mea­
sured by the Stroop Color and Word Test in order to 
provide evidence in support of this proposed mosaic 
paradigm and in particular the construct of cognitive 
flexibility. It was not intended to generalize the 
findings to specific populations. The paradigm also 
provides a theoretical perspective on how, in one 
respect, an individual interacts with his environment.
102
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Summary of Methodology 
The Defining Issues Test and the Stroop Color and 
Word Test were administered to freshman and sophomore 
college students. Half of the students took the DIT 
first, and half took the Stroop Test first. The DIT data 
were analyzed by computer at the Center for Moral 
Development in Minneapolis; the Stroop Test was scored by 
hand, as were the data with chi-square and descriptive 
analyses.
Summary of Findings 
The data did not support the first research hypo­
thesis (chi-square = .20, p > .05) which stated that 
among those subjects with a P score (see page 17 for a 
description of P and D scores on the DIT) of 35-46 on the 
DIT, there would be a significantly higher frequency of 
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than 
below the median.
The data did support the second hypothesis (chi- 
square = 3.5, E < .05) which stated that among those
subjects with a D score of 21-27 on the DIT, there would
be a significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility 
scores above the sample median than below the median.
The data also supported the third hypothesis 
(chi-square 3.27, p < .05) which stated that among those
subjects with a P score of 47 or higher there would be a
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significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility 
scores above the sample median than below the median.
The data failed, however, to support the fourth 
hypothesis (chi-square 0.36, p > .05) which stated that 
among those subjects with a D score of 28 or higher on 
the DIT, there would be a significantly higher frequency 
of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than 
below the median (see pages 92 - 99 for more detailed 
explanation).
In summary, the findings supported the second and 
third research hypotheses, but they failed to signifi­
cantly support the first and fourth hypotheses. While 
findings on the first and fourth hypotheses showed "ten­
dencies'* (the means of the flexible group are higher than 
those of the not flexible group) supporting the research 
hypotheses, they failed to reach statistical significance 
with the chosen statistical tests. It remains unknown if 
increased sample size or further revisions of the instru­
ments would make any difference in the results and the 
following interpretation.
Conclusions
Full support, or lack of support, of all four 
hypotheses would naturally make analysis of results 
simpler. Support of all four would lead directly to a 
consideration of the importance of the findings. Lack of 
support might direct the attention to the implications of
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such findings and possible modifications of the research 
design for future use. Thus, either outcome would pro­
vide a basis for further research. Hypothesis findings 
and interpretations, therefore, are related to theory. 
which, in turn, may be applied to individuals as well as 
to organizations.
It is believed that the findings of this study 
are a contribution to knowledge of both a statistically 
significant and non-statistically significant (trend) 
nature; and therefore, in this case, both of the above 
stated possibilities of no support or full support must 
be explored in the discussion. While more technically 
complicated, the following discussion suggests the sig­
nificance of the hypotheses and provides insights into 
the proposed paradigm.
Discussion of the results
The importance and implications of the hypotheses 
focus on the relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and moral reasoning. As stated earlier (see Chapter 4), 
the combined significant and non-significant findings 
respectively support, directly and indirectly, the exis­
tence of a relationship between these two aspects of the 
personality.
It may be conjectured that cognitive flexibility 
is a prerequisite for higher moral development. It is 
not, however, the onlv component needed for such
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development. In fact, a number of subjects (28 on the 
DIT D score; 41 on the DIT P score) with a "flexible" 
classification on the Stroop Test failed to show average 
or above average moral development. It may be that 
natural and supernatural factors, when combined with 
cognitive flexiblity, prompt higher moral development.
The importance of this possibility of higher 
moral reasoning lies in (1) the definitions given of 
moral reasoning, (2) its application in particular situa­
tions, and (3) in the factors which affect the level of 
moral reasoning attained. For example, varied educa­
tional, religious, and other systems (a group of inter­
dependent individuals under the influence of related 
functions creating a functional unit) claim to promote 
and utilize higher moral reasoning. Naturally, as these 
systems vary, so do the forms of moral reasoning within 
these settings.
The findings of this study speak to the necessity 
of individual and collective cognitive flexibility within 
these forms. Cognitive rigidity (relative lack of cogni­
tive flexibility— also called cognitive constriction) 
used to either maintain a system (religious, educational, 
political, corporate, and other), or to teach those in 
the system, may preclude development of the flexibility 
assumed here to be necessary for higher moral and other 
reasoning.
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Fear of heresy, or even fear of change itself, 
may lead to stunted individual/system growth, regression 
of moral and other types of reasoning, loss of system 
membership, and even demise of the system. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, stress can cause reasoning regression at 
various levels. The intra- and inter-individual conflict 
and fears experienced can prompt regression and even 
greater rigidity. A church or educational system, for 
example, presumed to be bastions of reasoning, can quite 
possibly become vehicles for individual and collective 
regression.
It might be wise at this point to explore a 
possible question of the reader. Can cognitive flexibil­
ity lessen the "protection" against "genuine error"?
While recognizing the subjective and objective qualities 
of "truth" and "error", the question must still be 
answered.
Based on the proposed paradigm and its definition 
of cognitive flexibility, the answer is that it does not 
increase already existing dangers of accepting errors.
The characteristics of cognitive flexbility include 
tendencies to process contrasting ideas or viewpoints and 
to deal with ambiguous information. Prior research (see 
page 41) found that those classified as flexible also 
show a higher ability to deal with the accompanying 
emotions of any given analysis or decision than those 
less flexible.
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This does not, however, equate with a greater 
acceptance of "error" or rejection of "truth". Quite to 
the contrary, it is believed that it is the flexiblity 
itself which "protects" the "truth". This may or may not 
include rejection of any given belief or behavior; this 
may or may not include acceptance of any given belief or 
behavior. It does, however, allow presumed (by an 
individual and/or system) "truth" and "error" to be 
similarly analyzed. It is this analysis that moves the 
beliefs beyond presumption. While it does not prevent 
acceptance of "error" or rejection of "truth", it does 
allow room for the exploration of "truth".
If the reader gleans nothing from this research 
save one idea, it is hoped that it is an understanding of 
the necessity to risk the inherent dangers involved in 
seeking out the truth— its beliefs, behaviors, and moral 
implications.
It is believed that people rob the "truth", moral 
reasoning, and moral behavior of their most precious 
assets (depth of understanding, ability to change, etc.) 
by "protecting" them out of fear of rejecting or losing 
them. People themselves may rob themselves of "truth" 
because of this same fear.
To move beyond this fear, individuals allow the 
capability of cognitive flexibility to guide cognitive 
processing through appropriately selected or newly devel­
oped mosaics. This type of cognitive processing leads to
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the growth of the individual. Moreover, it is believed 
that this growth embodies higher moral reasoning, higher 
moral behavior, and a relatively greater understanding of 
"truth".
Fortunately, the risks taken by an individual or 
system in viewing alternatives, exploring what is 
ambiguous, communicating with others with the same and 
opposing views, recognizing their own and others' erao- • 
tions, and, in general, maintaining cognitive flexibility 
can become the basis for cognitive growth, adaptation, 
and survival. An individual must incorporate the charac­
teristics of cognitive flexibility, such as those just 
mentioned, into his personality. Similarly an organiza­
tion must incorporate cognitive flexibility into the 
training of its members in order to grow. Unfortunately, 
some individuals perceive this as a risk to be avoided at 
all costs.
A lack of understanding regarding the relation­
ship between cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning in 
individuals and organizations can lead to a standstill or 
even to regression in moral development and other 
cognitive functions. Conversely, a clear understanding 
of this relationship by individuals and organizations can 
lead to more meaningful applications.
Incorporation requires, however, that an 
individual or an organization have cognitive flexibility 
as a goal or, at least, regard cognitive flexibility as
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important. Usage of metacognition (thinking about think­
ing) , understanding the dynamics of the interaction of 
reason and emotion, tolerance in dealing with ambiguity, 
and general practices of independent and open-minded 
thinking represent possible ways in which cognitive 
flexbility may be developed. Awareness and acceptance of 
flexiblity itself may very well be the cornerstone of 
such development.
The following delineates the importance and 
implications of the findings as applied to the proposed 
paradigm.
Personalitv paradigm
Important in beginning this paradigm exploration 
are findings on cognitive flexibility. Again, it is not 
proposed that this study "proves" the paradigm, but 
rather that it begins the investigation of support for 
the paradigm. As such, the importance of this research 
lies in the initial information involving flexibility and 
in the viability of the paradigm itself.
Paradigm reviewed. A pattern or mosaic is a 
unique combination of cognitive processes within the 
mind. The first mosiac may be genetically derived, 
prompting early development. It is this first pattern 
that allows for the first interaction with the environ­
ment.
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Once this first processing pattern is firmly 
established, the person is able to interpret and utilize 
data from the environment. This mosaic, therefore, 
exists as just one of many eventual mosaics. Varied 
experiences, maturation, and learning naturally prompt 
new patterns.
The proposed paradigm consists of a hierarchy of 
many such mosaics involving the cognitive subsystem. It 
is believed that this set of mosaics has two dimensions: 
(1) adaptability (ranging from low to high adaptability) 
and (2) mosaic recency (ranging from earliest formed to 
most recently formed). The capacity to select for use in 
a situation an appropriate mosaic from among the mosaic 
repertoire augments psychological and biological adapta­
tion and survival.
If this cognitive flexibility is compromised, by 
stress for example, individuals may show inappropriate 
hierarchical regression (inappropriate usage of mosaic 
— a less adaptive mosaic). Regression patterns may vary 
in inappropriateness for any given situation, and the 
level of inappropriateness is relative to the individu­
al's biological and psychological maturity.
The duration and dominating quality of such 
regression depends on stress-related circumstances, the 
cognitive flexibility of the personality, and the health 
and coping mechanisms of the individuals. It is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
believed that cognitive flexibility is necessary for the 
growth and adaptation of an individual.
Cognitive flexibilitv. Cognitive flexibility is 
the capacity to select one mosiac from a pattern reper­
toire and to create other patterns as needed. It forms 
the core of the paradigm and describes the individual 
interacting with the environment.
While it is not proposed to fully define or sub­
divide the components or processes of any given mosaic 
(an impossible task due to the complex, individualized, 
conceptual nature of mosaics), an example is offered in 
hopes of further clarifying the idea of cognitive flexi­
bility.
A prominent example comes from events occurring 
during the writing of this dissertation— that of the 
"Chinese revolution" (the Tianamen Square, Beijing inci­
dent in 1989). Utilizing different mosaics, an 
individual may "understand" this world event in corres­
pondingly different ways. Here "understanding" 
includes cognition of the causes, dynamics of the situa­
tion, and the consequences and implications of the event 
within the context of cultural, social, political, and 
economic characteristics of any given situation.
For instance, an individual may experience fear 
concerning a possible World War III. In the proposed
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paradigm, this fear may cause regression and thus use of 
a less adaptive mosaic.
One such mosaic (see page 13, mosaic C) might 
involve allowing for little ambiguous information, view­
ing the event within the context of past United States 
history, concern for how it affects that individual, the 
expressing of moderate emotion, and focus on what a 
particular significant other person considers important 
about the event.
In more specific terms, the individual using this 
mosaic may look to one particular news source, show 
preference for a particular type of sensory input such as 
audio or visual information concerning the event, view 
the Chinese Revolution as merely a transplanted American 
Revolution, and focus only on information of how the 
event will economically affect the United States and 
himself.
Further interaction of the cognitive subsystem 
with the values, affective, sensory, and motor subystems 
might lead to particular feelings, attitudes, and 
behavior. Feelings of patriotism with a positive 
attitude of "rightness" of the event may lead to demon­
strating with Chinese students in his city. Moreover, 
it is believed that this mosaic's processing of this 
information will affect future processing with this 
topic, with similar events, and even appropriately/inap­
propriately with dissimilar events. In other words, what
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we are is a sum total of our past experiences and choices 
of processing.
While the reader may not find fault with the 
general results of this mosaic's effect, this mosaic 
could prove inferior to other, more adaptive mosaics. 
Another limitation of this mosaic may be the individual's 
looking to a source outside of himself to shape, not 
merely to add to, his perceptions of the event.
Beyond the type, form, and amount of input pro­
cessed, the individual simply did not deal with data 
which might be conflicting. It is believed that a par­
ticular mosaic defines the parameters of conflict/ 
ambiguity. Here, if new information conflicted 
with information from the chosen source, the individual 
more than likely just ignored the new data.
In not dealing with conflicting information and 
perspectives, stress may have been reduced. Processing 
conflicting information involves the problem of deter­
mining what is to be believed— a situation which draws 
energy. It is proposed that this drain increases the 
level of stress, or may even equate with stress. Yet, 
while this mosaic may have reduced the stress of the 
situation for the individual, it remains doubtful that 
the exchange for a more adaptable mosaic was equitable.
This reduction in the amount of information 
utilized, the limited cultural, political, and economic 
viewpoints, and the particular basis for feelings.
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attitudes, and behavior describe a less adaptive mosaic. 
The individual did process the information; however, 
another mosaic might have proven more adaptive.
For example, an individual with cognitive flexi­
bility would be aware of his own cognitive processes and 
would process any information with insights into his own 
thinking (see page 11, mosaic A).
This more adaptive mosaic might have included a 
relatively higher tolerance of ambiguity/conflict in the 
information, the viewpoint of Chinese culture and poli­
tics, concern for possible consequences for the 
individuals in China, and an ability to express the 
feelings evoked— a mosaic tailored (drawn from repertoire 
or created) for this event.
This individual may incorporate as many forms and 
sources of information— dealing with ambiguous or con­
flicting reports— to arrive at what he believes best 
represents the situation, with a realization and accep­
tance of what he will be unable to ascertain. He may 
view the Chinese Revolution as both similar and not 
similar to other revolutions, but would maintain an 
understanding within the context of the Chinese culture.
The cognitive subsystem interacting with values, 
affect, sensory, and motor subsystems produces feelings, 
attitudes, and a behavior repertoire. His feelings may 
involve a wide range of acceptable and expressed affect, 
while he may not have established a set attitude beyond
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that of a positive attitude towards the event. He may 
exhibit no behavior related to the revolution save that 
of discussing the event with others.
This mosaic incorporates those components more 
suited to the event than the prior mosaic. The amount of 
information, the ability to perceive an event from 
another cultural viewpoint, and the gleaning of "truth" 
from a wide variety of sources and forms exhibits a 
broadly based foundation of adaptability.
While the attitudes or behaviors resulting from 
the chosen appropriate and inappropriate mosaics may not 
differ, the reasoning and potential behaviors of the 
appropriate mosaic are more adaptive to the situation— an 
analysis that proves more valuable in understanding 
current events in China.
This does not mean, however, that this inap­
propriate mosaic would be inappropriate in all situa­
tions. It may be helpful, for instance in learning a 
simple, highly motor-focused task. Non-conflicting 
information from a competent source processed by a "fill- 
in-the-blank" mentality (mosaic stereotype which leaves 
much of the shaping of the input to someone else) might 
prove best for this situation.
It is not believed that a new mosaic exists for 
every new situation, but rather that a flexible 
individual is more likely to use the most appropriate 
mosaic. The appropriateness depends on what is available
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from the environment and from prior experience or 
insight, the individual's cognitive abilities, and the 
complexity of the situation. In some cases this may 
involve a new mosaic, but in many cases this would be 
unnecessary, even inappropriate. It is cognitive flexi­
bility that makes the choice possible.
The training of cognitive flexility and an aware­
ness of thinking are believed to be primarily conscious 
processes (see page 13, Figure 3). However, choice of 
any new mosaic may not be a conscious choice. Awareness 
and self-development of cognitive flexibility, however, 
prompt the likelihood of choosing (unconsciously/con­
sciously) more adaptive mosaics.
Each mosaic reflects the unique preferences and 
experiences of the individual. Here uniqueness results 
from a myriad of genetic predispositions interacting with 
a possibly infinite combination of experiences which 
forms a personalized mosaic repertoire. The two mosaics 
mentioned above were chosen for their extreme differences 
in processing. It is proposed that many mosaics exist 
with any number of cognitive components. It is an 
individual's cognitive flexiblity which determines the 
number, nature, and creation of mosaics best suited for 
adaptation, survival, and growth within the many situa­
tions encountered daily.
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The following section integrates this explanation 
of cognitive flexibility and mosaics and reviews the 
proposed paradigm with the research findings.
Integration of proposed paradigm with findings
The research results and interpretations show a 
necessary but not sufficient relationship between cogni­
tive flexibility and moral reasoning (see pages 91 - 101 
where a more complete assessment of the findings is 
addressed)• This means that flexibility within the 
cognitive subsystem is a necessary element of higher 
moral reasoning which is assumed to involve the value and 
cognitive subsystems. It also means that such flexibil­
ity is not the only element necessary for higher moral 
reasoning. This impacts on the proposed paradigm in 
terms of indicating a relationship among the constructs 
of cognitive flexiblity, cognitive mosaics, and the 
cognitive and other subsystems.
This study suggests and supports a relationship 
between flexibility and general reasoning abilities. It 
is believed that these abilities, in turn, affect other 
subsystems within the proposed paradigm.
As mentioned previously according to the Wardell 
and Royce model, personality exists as an integrative 
function. Moral reasoning in this study, for instance, 
exists in the interaction between the cognitive and value 
subsystems within the personality. Such interactions
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exist between other subsystems, creating a dynamic whole 
called the personality.
In fact, addition of one of these subsystems—  
affect— is required in the description of "flexible" 
individuals (see Chapter 2). This researcher prefers the 
term cognitive-affective flexibility to cognitive flexi­
bility, as the former more accurately reflects the 
dynamic characteristic of a mosaic.
Within this paradigm, it is believed that higher 
moral reasoning represents the choice of an appropriate 
mosaic. This more highly developed reasoning involves 
analyzing a problem from multiple perspectives; inclusion 
of ambiguous and/or conflicting information; acceptance 
of emotional input; and often, processing from a 
perspective unique to the analysis of a particular situa­
tion— a process descriptive of cognitive flexibility.
This perspective involves a combination of cogni­
tive processes which in this study is called a mosaic or 
pattern. The choice of an appropriate cognitive mosaic 
is a function of cognitive flexibility.
Again, the interpretation of the results of this 
study show that cognitive flexibility appears to be a 
necessary basis for higher moral reasoning. Yet students 
classified as "flexible" on the Stroop Test did not all 
show higher moral reasoning on the DIT. It is suggested, 
therefore, that cognitive flexibility is not the only 
factor involved in higher moral reasoning. Instead
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cognitive flexibility is a necessary but not sufficient 
basis for higher moral reasoning.
This study, therefore, indicates the proposed 
relationship between cognitive flexibility, cognitive 
mosaics, and the cognitive and other subsystems within 
the context of the proposed paradigm. In other words, 
the research findings of a relationship between cognitive 
flexibility (Stroop Test scores) and moral reasoning (DIT 
scores) can be taken as evidence for the paradigm subsys­
tems of which they are considered a part.
The relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and moral reasoning can be taken also as evidence for an 
interaction between the subsystems. Furthermore, with 
cognitive flexibility so closely related to cognitive 
mosaics in the paradigm, evidence for cognitive flexibil­
ity can be considered as evidence for the existence of 
cognitive mosaics.
While cognitive mosaics remain a construct 
reflecting processes within the personality, support of 
this construct provides a framework for analysis of both 
cognitive processes and the personality.
In light of these associations, the proposed 
personality paradigm appears viable. The significance of 
this possibility is that of the heuristic potential of 
any newly proposed personality paradigm. That, in turn, 
has further ramifications for theory and practice.
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In addition to the associations and implications 
just previously noted, there are other, more extended 
implications.
For instance, an individual or society may know­
ingly affect the number, type, and sophistication of 
mosaics utilized by an individual. It is believed that 
these mosaics develop from a genetic and environmental 
relationship, although the specific genetic limitations 
and the actual amount of possible environmental control 
cannot be determined.
While the proposed paradigm remains a concep­
tualization for explaining cognitive processes in gen­
eral, the implications and potential applications can be 
explored in terms of relation to early development, 
continuing development, and links with behavior.
Early development. As mentioned earlier (see 
Chapter 1, Description of the Proposed Paradigm), the 
paradigm proposes a developmental task of a first-learned 
mosaic. [(The development of subsequent mosaics is in 
part explainable through the use of developmental task 
theory (e.g., Havighurst, 1972)].
Can parents, teachers, friends, and others know­
ingly influence these developmental tasks? If so, how 
might this be accomplished? While developing flexibility 
and more advanced mosaics is envisioned as a continuing 
task, is there a "critical” period for cognitive
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flexibility or the formation of any particular mosaic?
As this research represents only beginning paradigm 
exploration, the answers to these questions remain tenta­
tive.
It is believed, however, that beginning answers 
include (1) the possibility of nurturing cognitive 
flexibility (and additional mosaics), (2) teaching tech­
niques for self-growth, and (3) modeling cognitive flexi­
bility. This "nurturing" may begin (it is not implied 
that full self-awareness and understanding occurs within 
the first few years) with teaching and modeling a tenet 
of metacognition— awareness of one's own thinking. Upon 
this foundation, skills in recognizing and dealing with 
conflicting and ambiguous information and emotions can be 
demonstrated, taught, prompted, and encouraged.
These objectives can be accomplished through 
guiding individuals through "novel" and challenging 
situations and the making of decisions. This guidance 
includes asking those questions which make a person aware 
of different perspectives for any situation, modeling 
relative comfort in the presence of ambiguous informa­
tion, and teaching them to deal with conflicting ideas 
within the limits of their cognitive reasoning abili­
ties. Most importantly, this sharing includes showing 
the developing person how to deal with difficult situa­
tions without paralyzing or regression-prompting fear.
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In contrast, this does not emphasize the 
encouragement of individuals to focus on changing "grey" 
situations (situations involving conflicting, ambiguous 
information or perspectives with no "right" answer) into 
black and white problems for which there is a relatively 
easily recognized answer. Instead it involves training 
and honing abilities to utilize cognitive flexibility and 
associated mosaics in accepting or tolerating many life 
situations of an ambiguous nature.
Moral dilemmas often involve situations where one 
set of values and morals comes into conflict with alter­
native sets of values and morals. Cognitive flexibility, 
the ability to develop or choose a mosaic to deal with a 
specific situation, allows the individual to incorporate 
possibly competing values and morals into a unique solu­
tion. This relatively more inclusive and developed 
approach permits a potentially higher form of moral (or 
other) reasoning. In this approach, the moral decision 
does not become one of choosing between the morality of 
stealing versus the value of life. Both aspects are 
incorporated within a higher moral reasoning utilizing 
cognitive flexibility.
As many behaviors resulting in growth may become 
self-reinforced, it is believed that such guidance in 
cognitive flexibility can promote self-reinforced growth 
toward increased flexiblity and reasoning abilities.
Such guidance, however, comes best from cognitively
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
flexible individuals— these individuals can both teach 
and model behavior based on personal past experiences.
The ability to discuss openly those ideas and 
perspectives which differ from one's own belief system 
requires a great deal of cognitive flexibility. The 
danger of fear-prompted regression becomes even greater 
when this conflict involves beliefs of a church, corpora­
tion, governmental, educational, or other system. While 
religious systems may traditionally represent closely 
held, fought-for beliefs, any system may hold written/ 
unwritten beliefs.
It is recognized that the degree of possible fear 
from having a belief or resulting code of behavior chal­
lenged is definitely related to the importance given such 
beliefs and/or behaviors, and that some systems 
naturally involve different levels of importance to an 
individual. Nonetheless, it is believed that fear and 
fear-prompted plateaus or regressions may occur in any 
system where the individual accords undue importance to 
that system's written/unwritten beliefs.
For example, a political organization may have an 
unwritten code of behavior that discourages direct con­
frontation of an advisor's proposal. If one individual 
challenged this code and did question an idea or even a 
master plan, for instance, fear may be prompted in those 
individuals nearing the top of the political ladder. If
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this fear results in several of these individuals select­
ing an inappropriate mosaic, such as one of ignoring all 
ideas or differing perspectives proposed by the chal­
lenging individual, group think may result. This group 
think, in turn, may result in stagnation or even dissolu­
tion of the political party or organization.
Another current example, this one from the cor­
porate world, involves the common belief that spouses 
cannot or should not work within the same level (usually 
a high, executive level) of a corporate structure. This 
experience, new to corporate systems, often results in 
the firing of one or both executives.
Whatever the fear behind the inability to not 
even consider all the alternatives to this new dynamic 
within the system (noted inflexibility in not considering 
new options sometimes having conflicting and/or ambigious 
information about the results of such a situation), the 
usage of such a fear-prompted mosaic costs corporations 
valuable human resources. The solution for integrating 
this relationship into higher levels of many corporations 
remains unanswered. It is not proposed that the answer 
itself will be simple or uncomplicated. It is proposed, 
however, that this is just another example of the rela­
tionship between cognitive flexibility, fear, and growth. 
It shows, moreover, possible results of this interaction 
within any system.
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Can the "average" adult foster cognitive flexi­
bility in youth when this process courts a chance for 
them to believe and behave in conflict with a societal or 
religious belief system important to him? Fear of this 
outcome could lead to cognitive regression and constric­
tion of the adult— which he may unwittingly model and 
teach them.
If the more mature individual elects the "safer" 
avenue, those younger than he may or may not finally 
embrace his belief system. He has, however, taken away 
opportunties for them to understand their own thinking 
processes, and he has reduced opportunities for learning 
the art of cognitive flexibility from his influence.
This absence, in turn, may lead potentially to a 
new generation of "constricted" individuals who have 
difficulty in understanding, let alone encouraging, 
cognitive flexibility in others. Under these cir­
cumstances, self-perpetuating "constriction" may lead to 
stunted individual and organizational growth. It may 
even lead to the eventual death of a religious, politi­
cal, societal, or other belief system.
Hope may be found in the proposed belief that 
cognitive flexiblity is a continuing growth task which 
should be encouraged in adulthood— an occurrence which, 
in part, may break a vicious cycle of inflexibility.
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Continuing development. It is believed that cog­
nitive flexibility and the development of mosaics, while 
perhaps more easily learned in certain situations, is not 
restricted to a "critical" growth period. This task 
potentially continues throughout life. Applications of 
the proposed paradigm, therefore, go beyond early devel­
opment to continuing development.
With current knowledge and available testing 
instruments, means for adult development of cognitive 
flexibility include, for one, the identification of 
"flexible" versus "less flexible" individuals. Training 
programs, inservice seminars, support groups, and coun­
seling can additionally develop their technniques, 
pacing, and goals to accomodate to the developmental 
needs of their trainees or clients.
In the graduate preparation of those in the 
helping profession (see Chapter 1, page 3) adaptive 
intervention and counseling sessions may prove important 
in the process of facilitating professional and personal 
growth. It is not suggested that extended therapy would 
change this situation, but rather that a variety of 
services could promote cognitive flexibility and adapta­
tion within and beyond the typical graduate program.
These interventions and services might start with 
stress-related tactics. For instance, training in 
conflict-oriented communication, stress reduction, and
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coping techniques may, in part, eliminate the fears and 
anxiety that can evoke more primal, less adaptive mosa­
ics .
Future teaching and counseling practices dealing 
with hierarchical regression may actually increase cogni­
tive flexibility in those so instructed. It is postu­
lated that working through issues of trust with "less 
flexible" individuals at regressed levels may produce a 
more solid foundation within the mosaic hierarchy. It is 
in moving towards cognitive flexibility, however, that 
potentials for adaptation, survival, and growth are 
realized. With further exploration of cognitive flexi­
bility and more advanced techniques of classification, 
individuals may indeed develop greater capacity for 
cognitive flexibility.
Cognitive flexibilitv and behavior. Possible 
behavioral evidences of cognitive "constriction" and 
regression have been mentioned previously. In contrast, 
how will increasing cognitive flexibility translate into 
behavior? This question involves consideration of the 
process beginning with information processed through 
cognitive mosaics and other subsystems as they contribute 
to the decisions and behavior within the strictures of 
realized circumstances.
As seen in the context of moral reasoning, cogni­
tion is not always consistent with, nor does it predict.
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behavior. This is because reasoning exists as only one 
factor in organizing and acting out options within any 
behavior repertoire. Since many theories explain the 
relationship between cognition and behavior (e.g., 
Bandura, 1977; Piaget, 1951; Tolman, 1948), that syn­
thesis is not attempted in this discussion.
It is proposed, however, that any potential 
behavior based on a decision involving relatively all- 
inclusive and synthesized information and insight can be 
more adaptive and "moral" than behavior based on a "con­
stricted" decision. In other words, it is believed that 
cognitive flexibility not only increases behavior 
options, but also increases the potential for more devel­
oped and adaptive behaviors within an individual's reper­
toire. The link between cognitive mosaics and behavior 
exists, therefore, in a form such as to facilitate the 
creating of potentially improved behavior.
While this link may never be fully understood, it 
is believed that the applications mentioned above reflect 
a potential for individually and societally-based in­
creased cognitive flexibility.
One can hardly speculate on the limits of such 
potentials. With the immense capabilities and unused 
potential that exists within the two brain hemispheres, 
it is suggested that the potential exists for an infinite 
number of patterns to be developed. The fact that the
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mind is composed of two hemispheres instead of a simple 
mass of neurons suggests a myriad of interactional fac­
tors. The importance and further implications of the 
proposed paradigm lies in (1) heuristically forwarding 
attention to an understanding of the requirements for 
facillitating the wholistic integration of the two hemi­
spheres, (2) noting correlation with observations, and 
(3) developing applications of the theory.
Personality theories, by nature, remain concep­
tual. It remains for collective observations and empiri­
cal explorations of aspects of the theory to support or 
fail to support the proposed paradigm. This study com­
bined both theory and research in this beginning inves­
tigation of the paradigm.
Summary
In combination with findings from the hypotheses, 
the suggested paradigm advances knowledge and provides 
encouragement for possible applications. Further analy­
sis of other relationships and aspects of the paradigm 
lie with future studies.
Recommendations 
The following suggestions are made: 
Recommendations for practice
1. Recommendations for practice lie in an
understanding and employment of cognitive
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flexibility within training situations.
This involves prompting and using open- 
mindedness, communication with others with 
dissimilar viewpoints, appropriate usage 
of affect, personal comfort with ambiguity, 
and an insight into "thinking about think 
ing. "
2. Parallel to the preceding suggestion, it 
is highly recommended that systems of all 
types (church, education, business- 
oriented organizations, etc.) incorporate 
the characteristics of cognitive flexibility 
into all aspects of their structure and 
encourage such traits on an individual level.
For further research
1. Relationships between cognitive flexibility 
and other aspects of personality certainly 
warrant further investigation.
2. More refined instruments measuring cogni­
tive flexibility need to be developed. It 
is hoped that such tests will then become 
available to professionals.
3. It is recommended that other studies 
empirically explore varying aspects of the
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proposed paradigm or framework (e.g., 
cognitive flexibility and self-concept, 
cognitive flexiblity over time). While the 
preliminary theoretical nature of the para­
digm is recognized, possibilities for 
empirical support invites investigation.
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